On 31 December 2013 16:20, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 12/30/2013 6:09 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 31 December 2013 07:44, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/30/2013 2:07 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 30 December 2013 21:02, Stephen Paul King <[email protected] >> > wrote: >> >>> Dear Bruno, >>> >>> Why do you not consider an isomorphism between the Category of >>> computer/universal-numbers >>> and physical realities? That way we can avoid a lot of problems! >>> I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view >>> that the material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status >>> and the assumption that a timeless totality = the appearance of change (and >>> its measures) is illusory. I would like to be wrong in this presumption! >>> >>> The problem is that assuming the material / physical realm as >> fundamental gets you no further than assuming that "God did it!" It's a >> "shut up and calculate" (or shut up and pray) ontology. >> >> With materialism you just have a "brute fact" - well, maybe that's it, >> maybe there *is *just a brute, unexplained fact. But us ape descended >> life forms like to look for explanations even beneath the apparent brute >> facts! >> >> >> But "Everything happens" is just as useless as "God did it". A theory >> that can explain anything fails to explain at all. >> >> It can't explain *anything*. It just says that all outcomes of the laws > of physics are instantiated. This requires less information than saying > that a specific outcome of the LOP is instantiated, assuming the LOP allow > more than one outcome. > > But I feel that you must already know this. Are you just being Devil's > Advocate, or do you honestly not see the usefulness of multiverse theories? > > > Stephen isn't talking about a multiverse as implied by physics, he's > talking about an immaterialist theory, a "timeless Platonic totality", > which I can only suppose consists of everything not self-contradictory or > some such. >
Sorry. I was replying to this: I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view that the material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status If I'm in the wrong discussion I will bow out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
