On 02 Jan 2014, at 22:14, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 01 Jan 2014, at 16:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I think that we should start with 1p - the solipsist - as
fundamental and then work from there to solve the problem of the
other which will give us a 3p.
That's for woman and engineers. The doer.
Imagine that! I will not take that statement as an insult. I am
actually interested in the possibility of "artificial intelligence"
as a reality, so these questions are not just an intellectual
IF AI is a reality, that would be an incentive for comp. But comp is
stronger that "strong AI". machine can think does not imply that only
machine can think, so they might think, and we could still be non-
machine. Logically. Psychologically, if strong AI is true, it is
doubtful we are not machines, as we have no evidences for that at all.
It is only the right brain, and in a manner were you will not find
any two different right brains ever agreeing.
So? I am OK with a consensus definition of truth.
That makes truth dependent on us. But truth, especially the
transcendental, *is* supposed to be independent of us, beyond us, etc.
All you need for comp is the belief in "17 is prime", or "the machine
i stop after k step on input j", etc.
As I see things, we can derive the Platonic notion of trust by
defining Absolute Truth as that which is incontrovertible for all
Finite worlds that have finite signal propagation speeds and finite
resource accessibility don't care about Platonia.
They exists in the arithmetical Platonia. That's a fact. You can't
Once you say "yes" to the doctor, you don't even need to define the
1p, just believe it is conserved for 3p transform of the body.
Let's say that I built a computer system and showed you the
theoretical basis for a claim that it will be self-aware. Will you
switch it on? I am serious!
Why not? The real question is "do we have the right to switch it off?"
But then in the ideal case of correct machine, defining rational
beliefs by provability, the definition of knowledge, and thus of the
knower, given by Theaetetus reappears!.
Computationalism provides 3p accounts on the 1p, by computer science
and the self-referential logics G and G* and their intensional
Honestly, Bruno. Could you try some other equivalent explanation
other than your "canonical"? I like Louis Kauffman's Eigenforms.
He is an expert in knot theory. G and G* are just advanced form of his
Eigenforms. It is math, we can change the canonical, because the
canonical is given by theorems, notably on those "eigenforms".
With comp we accept the others and the 3p, and science can only
build on that. The 1p is personal, private, non definable. I agree
it is ultrafundamental, and comp illustrates its role in the
physical selection, but it is not a primitive concept in the basic
ontology. Computer science gives them on a plateau.
I worry that science here has become "scientism".
Why? That's seems to me to be a quite unfair gratuitous remark.
Nobody asks anyone to believe in comp, nor even in "17 is
prime" (although you are asked this for the sake of the argument).
It is proved that if comp is correct, then the 1p and knowers are
recovered by the most common definition of knowledge.
It is not scientism, it is reasoning in an hypothetical context. To
confuse "reasoning" and scientism is bad philosophy, imo.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.