On 03 Jan 2014, at 07:55, Jason Resch wrote:

I sort of see the opposite trend. More and more physicists are looking for an information based fundamental theory.

But where is the information coming from? If no where or nothing, this is just a form of idealism.

Except that physicists wanting information being fundamental still insist, with Landauer, that information is physical (indeed quantum one).

This just makes no sense when we assume that we are machine (even quantum one), and seems quite ad hoc (as you say: where does that information comes from?).

The real problem of the "MWI" is not in the "many", but in the notion of "world" which is never defined. Computationalism offers somehow a compromise between Bohr-Pauli-Fuchs and Everett: as there is no worlds a priori, only many dream/local-knowledge. All there is just 0 and the successors, and the only laws needed to be assumed are addition and multiplication. The coupling consciousness/realities is emergent from the possible 1p that computationalism attach to person supported by computations. Anything else require that the observers' bodies are not Turing emulable.



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