Dear Brent,

  I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something 
"real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism 
that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the possibility of 
coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined 
as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's 
definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we 
only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor" choice is 
possible.

On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: 
> > Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as 
> "what data feels 
> > like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts 
> his Mathematical 
> > Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I 
> wonder if it's 
> > possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - 
> after all, we do 
> > appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are 
> these the only 
> > ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of 
> conscious beings 
> > in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to 
> get the full story! 
>
> I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage 
> (although Bruno 
> disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip).  To escape solipism 
> there must be 
> objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can 
> act (c.f. Dr 
> Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order 
> to support 
> consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). 
>
> Brent 
>

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