Dear Edgar,

  Check out this article by S. Wolfram:

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/undecidability-intractability-theoretical-physics.pdf


On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote:

> Stephen,
>
> Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer
> most of your questions on the nature of experience.
>
> You will see in that post I note that the computational information
> universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see
> that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form
> in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other
> information forms by computationally interacting with them.
>
> So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is
> effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely
> of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers
> (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view).
> In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus
> the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in
> that sense I think we might agree.
>
> With regards your last point. The computational information system of the
> universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state
> is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of
> nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes
> itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically
> self-consistent and logically complete.
>
> However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be
> inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises.
> This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized
> approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce
> the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply
> to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:04:39 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>> Dear Edgar,
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Stephen,
>>>
>>> I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything
>>> that exists.
>>>
>>
>> I denote "everything that exist" as 'the Total Universe' or simply
>> "Existence". The key is that such is independent of any contingency or
>> property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a
>> definition which I find most useful.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of
>>> which there is only one,
>>>
>>
>> This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from
>> observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement.
>> This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM.
>> I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For
>> example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be
>> considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement.
>>
>>   I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using
>> Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which
>> many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is
>> common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a
>> unique "actual external reality".
>>
>>
>>
>>> and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and
>>> species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of
>>> the actual external reality that form their environments.
>>>
>>
>> If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows
>> that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not
>> use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our
>> experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses
>> this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal
>> to an external "Deity" for an explanation as to why what we experience is
>> not a hallucination or simulation.
>>   In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the
>> statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence
>> of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities
>> considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be
>> mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic...
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual
>>> simulated realities, not to the common external reality.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit.
>>
>>>
>>> Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not
>>> mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could
>>> just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since
>>> almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a
>>> manufactured simulation in our own minds.
>>>
>>
>> Consider that n goes to infinity and that p is the probability of that an
>> observer has experiences that can be matched up with those of another via
>> some diffeomorphism... The probability that the individual experience are
>> completely independent simulations becomes vanishingly small!
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> The actual reality is pure computationally evolving information in the
>>> presence of the substrate (what I call ontological energy) of reality. On
>>> the other hands the simulated realities in organismic minds manifest to the
>>> organisms as classical material worlds which they are not, and these vary
>>> quite widely among species....
>>>
>>
>> Do you consider the computational complexity involved? It has been
>> pointed out, for example by Stephen Wolfram, that faithfully simulating a
>> physical system (such that any number of observers having an experience of
>> "that systems" could agree that it is "the same system") is intractable (or
>> at least NP-Complete).
>>
>>   Experience is not a "magical" process! Its content can be quantified
>> and related to measures of information and algorithmic complexity. Why
>> don't you look into such?
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:26:16 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>
>>>> Dear Brent,
>>>>
>>>>    I have given my definition of reality previously, but here it is
>>>> again. For some collection of observers that can communicate, a reality is
>>>> that which is incontrovertible. In other words, a reality is that which all
>>>> observers agree. I do not like the idea of an a priori "reality" as such
>>>> can be defined arbitrarily to suit one's whim.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>  On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Dear Brent,
>>>>>
>>>>>    I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is
>>>>> something "real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of
>>>>> realism that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the
>>>>> possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. 
>>>>> Observers
>>>>> being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala
>>>>> Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical
>>>>> world, we only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor"
>>>>> choice is possible.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Notice that you had to put "real" in scare quotes - because it isn't
>>>>> clear what it means.  I think the conclusion is that, in Bruno's MGA, the
>>>>> inert program needs to include a great deal, essentially a whole universe.
>>>>> That doesn't make it wrong, but to me it makes it less interesting.  It
>>>>> would be surprising than an inert program could implement consciousness in
>>>>> this world, since it couldn't interact with this world.  But if it's
>>>>> conscious within it's own world, then it's just like any other simulation
>>>>> (e.g. The Matrix).
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>>>> > Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he
>>>>>> describes as "what data feels
>>>>>> > like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He
>>>>>> starts his Mathematical
>>>>>> > Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I
>>>>>> wonder if it's
>>>>>> > possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp
>>>>>> - after all, we do
>>>>>> > appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of
>>>>>> physics. Are these the only
>>>>>> > ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence
>>>>>> of conscious beings
>>>>>> > in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the
>>>>>> MUH to get the full story!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage
>>>>>> (although Bruno
>>>>>> disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip).  To escape
>>>>>> solipism there must be
>>>>>> objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you
>>>>>> can act (c.f. Dr
>>>>>> Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in
>>>>>> order to support
>>>>>> consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> Kindest Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Stephen Paul King
>>>>
>>>> Senior Researcher
>>>>
>>>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>>>>
>>>> step...@provensecure.com
>>>>
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>>
>>
>> --
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>> Kindest Regards,
>>
>> Stephen Paul King
>>
>> Senior Researcher
>>
>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>>
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Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher

Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/


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