On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Brent,

I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something "real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor" choice is possible.

Notice that you had to put "real" in scare quotes - because it isn't clear what it means. I think the conclusion is that, in Bruno's MGA, the inert program needs to include a great deal, essentially a whole universe. That doesn't make it wrong, but to me it makes it less interesting. It would be surprising than an inert program could implement consciousness in this world, since it couldn't interact with this world. But if it's conscious within it's own world, then it's just like any other simulation (e.g. The Matrix).

Brent


On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

    On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote:
    > Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as 
"what data
    feels
    > like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his
    Mathematical
    > Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I 
wonder if it's
    > possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - 
after all, we do
    > appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are 
these the
    only
    > ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of 
conscious
    beings
    > in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to 
get the
    full story!

    I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage 
(although Bruno
    disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip).  To escape solipism 
there must be
    objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act 
(c.f. Dr
    Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order 
to support
    consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).

    Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to