Stephen,

I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that 
exists. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, 
of which there is only one, and individual 'realities' which vary widely 
across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental 
simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their 
environments.

Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual 
simulated realities, not to the common external reality. 

Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean 
that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just 
refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost 
all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured 
simulation in our own minds.

The actual reality is pure computationally evolving information in the 
presence of the substrate (what I call ontological energy) of reality. On 
the other hands the simulated realities in organismic minds manifest to the 
organisms as classical material worlds which they are not, and these vary 
quite widely among species....

Edgar



On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:26:16 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Dear Brent,
>
>    I have given my definition of reality previously, but here it is again. 
> For some collection of observers that can communicate, a reality is that 
> which is incontrovertible. In other words, a reality is that which all 
> observers agree. I do not like the idea of an a priori "reality" as such 
> can be defined arbitrarily to suit one's whim.
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>  On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>  
>> Dear Brent, 
>>
>>    I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is 
>> something "real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of 
>> realism that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the 
>> possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers 
>> being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala 
>> Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical 
>> world, we only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor" 
>> choice is possible.
>>  
>>
>> Notice that you had to put "real" in scare quotes - because it isn't 
>> clear what it means.  I think the conclusion is that, in Bruno's MGA, the 
>> inert program needs to include a great deal, essentially a whole universe.  
>> That doesn't make it wrong, but to me it makes it less interesting.  It 
>> would be surprising than an inert program could implement consciousness in 
>> this world, since it couldn't interact with this world.  But if it's 
>> conscious within it's own world, then it's just like any other simulation 
>> (e.g. The Matrix).
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>  
>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>> On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: 
>>> > Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes 
>>> as "what data feels 
>>> > like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts 
>>> his Mathematical 
>>> > Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I 
>>> wonder if it's 
>>> > possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - 
>>> after all, we do 
>>> > appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. 
>>> Are these the only 
>>> > ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of 
>>> conscious beings 
>>> > in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH 
>>> to get the full story! 
>>>
>>> I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage 
>>> (although Bruno 
>>> disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip).  To escape 
>>> solipism there must be 
>>> objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can 
>>> act (c.f. Dr 
>>> Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in 
>>> order to support 
>>> consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
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>
> Stephen Paul King
>
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