On 9 January 2014 14:16, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]> wrote:
> Dear LizR, > > Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require > some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it > merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No? > Hm. I'm not sure! He requires a dynamic process, while the Platonic strings are "creating time indexically" - I'm not sure if these should give rise to different experiences, or not. > Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any > sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the > result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which > interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the > 'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being > in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would > have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they > are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property: > Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might > run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay > argument. > Yes, I would say that makes sense, but I am not sure how we do overcome this problem. (I may need to re-read some old posts...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
