On 9 January 2014 14:16, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

> Dear LizR,
>
>    Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require
> some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it
> merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No?
>

Hm. I'm not sure! He requires a dynamic process, while the Platonic strings
are "creating time indexically" - I'm not sure if these should give rise to
different experiences, or not.


>   Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any
> sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the
> result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which
> interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the
> 'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being
> in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would
> have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they
> are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property:
> Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might
> run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay
> argument.
>

Yes, I would say that makes sense, but I am not sure how we do overcome
this problem. (I may need to re-read some old posts...)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to