Dear LizR, Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No? Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the 'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property: Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay argument.
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 1:36:17 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: > > Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as > "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed > theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite > pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular > mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live > in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only > ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of > conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp > with the MUH to get the full story! > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
