Dear LizR,

   Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require 
some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it 
merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No?
  Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any 
sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the 
result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which 
interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the 
'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being 
in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would 
have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they 
are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property: 
Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might 
run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay 
argument.




On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 1:36:17 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as 
> "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed 
> theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite 
> pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular 
> mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live 
> in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only 
> ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of 
> conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp 
> with the MUH to get the full story!
>
>

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