Dear LizR,

  Creating time indexically (or otherwise) out maps to the natural ordering
of integers will not work! We use some equivalent to a Godel numbering to
code algorithms and distinguish them from each other, no? This break the
natural order and thus making it unavailable as an absolute quotienting of
the integers that can be pointed to as the order of events that is imposed
from the static and timeless Platonic realm.

  If we are going to use a dynamic process, when lets us one that makes
sense. One example of a ontological process is found in Prof. Kitada's work
where he ties to the fundamental undecidability of truth values of physical
states in a universal wave function, ala the Wheeler-Dewitt equation. Louis
Kauffman uses a similar reasoning in his Eigenforms. Why not just bite the
bullet and drop the idea that Being is fundamental and the Becoming is some
illusion?


On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 8:26 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 9 January 2014 14:16, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
>
>> Dear LizR,
>>
>>    Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require
>> some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it
>> merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No?
>>
>
> Hm. I'm not sure! He requires a dynamic process, while the Platonic
> strings are "creating time indexically" - I'm not sure if these should give
> rise to different experiences, or not.
>
>
>>   Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any
>> sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the
>> result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which
>> interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the
>> 'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being
>> in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would
>> have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they
>> are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property:
>> Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might
>> run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay
>> argument.
>>
>
> Yes, I would say that makes sense, but I am not sure how we do overcome
> this problem. (I may need to re-read some old posts...)
>
>
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Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher

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stephe...@provensecure.com

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