Jason, You'd have a snowball's chance in hell in publishing a paper there withOUT academic affiliation...
Edgar On Monday, January 13, 2014 11:33:42 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote: > > Edgar, > > The most well known is the arxiv. It is run out of cornell university. > Their website is arxiv.org > > Jason > > On Jan 13, 2014, at 7:59 AM, "Edgar L. Owen" <[email protected]<javascript:>> > wrote: > > Telmo, > > Thanks for the explanation, though it doesn't seem very applicable to > actual reality... > > I would be very interested in where one can submit papers without an > academic affiliation if you could provide names or links. Have you > submitted to any? > > Best, > Edgar > > On Monday, January 13, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> Hi Edgar, >> >> > I don't know what the "universal dovetailer" is... >> >> Not to worry, I'm sure not a lot of people do outside of this mailing >> list... :) >> >> Independently of your own theory, it's an interesting concept. Bruno >> might explain better, but it is basically an algorithm that executes >> all conceivable computer programs (given infinite time). It is >> impossible to know in advance if a given program will ever stop (the >> halting problem), so the dovetailer does the following: >> >> - execute the first instruction of program 1 >> - execute the second instruction of program 1 >> - execute the first instruction of program 2 >> - ... >> >> So on each cycle, the dovetailer introduces a new program into the mix. >> >> If you assume that reality is purely computational, then the UD >> generates the multi-verse. Even if you don't, it's a nice thought >> experiment. I would advise you to read Bruno's Universal Dovetailer >> Argument. Even if you don't like it, I think you should be aware of >> it. >> >> > Again, for the nth time, my theory has nothing to do with "comp" or >> "UD". >> >> Well you can't know that for sure until you read the Universal >> Dovetailer Argument... >> >> > It's a completely different theory. Just go by what I say and don't >> assume >> > any similarities. It's possible there are some but I'll leave that up >> to >> > others... >> >> Edgar, I'm not against the idea of reading your book, but I believe >> it's your job to sell it. I'm not saying that people outside of >> academia are not entitled to creating interesting theories (on the >> contrary), but I do think that it's wise to adopt a time-tested habit >> of academia: have shorter paper(s) to go with the book. It's a smaller >> time investment and, if people like the paper, they will likely want >> to read the book. >> >> I don't care if you publish said paper in a proper journal. There are >> several places on the internet where you can submit a paper without an >> academic affiliation. In fact, I suspect this will become increasingly >> popular. >> >> Cheers, >> Telmo. >> >> > Edgar >> > >> > >> > >> > On Saturday, January 11, 2014 6:32:17 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> Hi Edgar, >> >> >> >> > My theory of consciousness is made considerably clearer in detail in >> my >> >> > book >> >> > on Reality if you want to get the full story :-) >> >> > >> >> > The answers to some of your questions: >> >> > >> >> > Sure dreams are real, like everything is, but their reality is that >> they >> >> > are >> >> > dreams. Actually mind is continually actively simulating reality >> whether >> >> > asleep or awake, It continually goes off on its own predicting what >> it >> >> > thinks will happen before it even happens. When we are awake this >> >> > process is >> >> > continually corrected by incoming sensory information and brought >> back >> >> > on >> >> > track. During dreams sensory input to the process is minimal and >> that >> >> > self-correction process is minimal and the mind is freer to follow >> >> > directions of its own based on internal priorities. >> >> >> >> Ok, this is how I believe the brain works too. At a high-level: the >> >> hard stuff is in the implementation details :) >> >> >> >> > All this is explained in >> >> > detail in Part IV: Mind and Reality of my book. >> >> > >> >> > Ontological energy is NOT any form of physical energy. It's a >> somewhat >> >> > deficient term to signify the fact that reality is actually real and >> >> > actual >> >> > and actually here, present and happening right now. It is the >> 'stuff' or >> >> > 'substance' (entirely logical rather than physical) of actual >> existence >> >> > and >> >> > being, and because it is such that makes the forms and computations >> that >> >> > appear within it real and actual. >> >> >> >> What do you think of the Universal Dovetailer? Could it be what you >> >> mean by Ontological Energy? >> >> >> >> > OE is obviously difficult to properly describe. To paraphrase Lao >> Tse, >> >> > "The >> >> > ontological energy that can be named is not ontological energy". In >> fact >> >> > the >> >> > ancient concept of Tao was an ancient approach to pretty much the >> same >> >> > concept. If you know how to describe this without "overloading of >> terms" >> >> > then take a shot at it... >> >> >> >> No, I tend to agree with Lao Tse... >> >> >> >> > You ask "how do I know the physical world (doesn't) arise from >> >> > consciousness?" I don't claim that. I agree the 'physical' world >> DOES >> >> > arise >> >> > from conscousness. That's what I've said all along, if you've been >> >> > following. >> >> > The actual external reality is NOT physical, it's computational. >> >> >> >> So you believe in comp? >> >> >> >> > It consists entirely of the computational interaction of information >> >> > forms >> >> > in OE. >> >> >> >> This sounds like comp and UD. >> >> >> >> > All so called physical worlds are how organismic minds simulate >> their >> >> > interactions with this information world. Organismic, including >> human, >> >> > minds >> >> > simulate information reality as a physical reality because that >> makes it >> >> > easier to compute and interact with and thus function within. All >> the >> >> > many >> >> > ways this happens is described in detail in my book... >> >> >> >> Ok, again this seems compatible with the concepts of 1p/3p, which are >> >> frequently mentioned in this mailing list. (not everyone likes them, >> >> for sure... I do) >> >> >> >> Cheers >> >> Telmo >> >> >> >> > The only 'physical worlds' are products of organismic minds and >> occur >> >> > only >> >> > within those minds as simulations of the external information >> reality. >> >> > Actual fundamental external reality is computationally evolving >> >> > information >> >> > in OE only. >> >> > >> >> > Edgar >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:06:49 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> Hi Edgar, >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok, I'll bite :) >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 3:09 PM, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >> > All, >> >> >> > >> >> >> > I'll present a brief overview of my theory of consciousness from >> my >> >> >> > book >> >> >> > on >> >> >> > Reality here. If anyone is interested I can elaborate. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > To understand consciousness we first must clearly distinguish >> between >> >> >> > consciousness ITSELF and >> >> >> >> >> >> > the contents of consciousness that become conscious >> >> >> >> >> >> This seems circular. >> >> >> >> >> >> > by appearing within consciousness itself. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > The nature of consciousness itself, why things seem conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> I would argue that why things seem conscious can be explained with >> >> >> neuroscience + computer science. The real mystery is why I am >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> > is the >> >> >> > subject of Chalmer's 'Hard Problem', whereas the various >> structures >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > contents of consciousness are the so called 'Easy Problems', the >> >> >> > subjects of >> >> >> > the study of mind. >> >> >> >> >> >> Several theories of mind address consciousness, notably comp (as >> Liz >> >> >> pointed out) >> >> >> >> >> >> > Chalmer's formulation of the Hard Problem is 'How does >> consciousness >> >> >> > arise >> >> >> > from a physical brain?' Let's generalized this a little to 'How >> does >> >> >> > consciousness arise from a physical world?' >> >> >> >> >> >> Here you're already making a strong assumption. How do you know >> it's >> >> >> not the other way round: the physical world arising from >> >> >> consciousness? >> >> >> >> >> >> > The key to the solution is understanding that the world is not >> >> >> > 'physical' in >> >> >> > the sense assumed. It is not a passive clockwork Newtonian world >> that >> >> >> > just >> >> >> > sits there waiting to be brought into consciousness by an >> observer. >> >> >> > In >> >> >> > fact >> >> >> > the notion of observation is intrinsic to reality itself in a >> manner >> >> >> > that >> >> >> > reality actively manifests most of the defining attributes of >> reality >> >> >> > on >> >> >> > its >> >> >> > own and all the conscious observer adds is participation in that >> >> >> > process >> >> >> > from a particular locus with a particular computational >> nformation >> >> >> > structure. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > I'll explain how this works though the theory is subtle and >> requires >> >> >> > some >> >> >> > work, and there is a lot to it I don't cover here. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > In ancient times there was an extramission (emission) theory of >> >> >> > vision, >> >> >> > that >> >> >> > objects were seen because the eyes shown light on them. Today we >> >> >> > still >> >> >> > have >> >> >> > the functionally identical emission theory of consciousness, that >> >> >> > things >> >> >> > become conscious because mind somehow shines consciousness on >> them. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Both theories are wrong. Things are conscious because reality >> >> >> > continually >> >> >> > SELF-MANIFESTS itself. It continually computes itself into >> existence, >> >> >> > and >> >> >> > existence self-manifests. >> >> >> >> >> >> This makes sense to me. I have similar intuitions but I don't feel >> >> >> this is sufficiently rigorous or well-defined (as my intuitions are >> >> >> also not). >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is immanent because it is actually real, and >> >> >> > actually present, and has actual being. This is what I call >> >> >> > Ontological >> >> >> > Energy (OE). >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok but I dislike this kind of overloading of terms. Unless you >> argue >> >> >> that Ontological Energy has some convincing similarities to the >> well >> >> >> accepted concept of energy. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Things are really really real, they are really actually there, >> >> >> > and consciousness just opens its 'eyes' and participates in this >> >> >> > reality. >> >> >> > Rather than the mind shining consciousness onto things, things >> >> >> > manifest >> >> >> > their actual reality, their actual real presence in reality, to >> >> >> > whatever >> >> >> > interacts with them, including human brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> So are dreams real? >> >> >> >> >> >> > The only thing an individual observer brings to consciousness is >> an >> >> >> > interaction with reality from a particular location, and an >> >> >> > interaction >> >> >> > with >> >> >> > the information contents of consciousness filtered through its >> own >> >> >> > perceptual cognitive structure. >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Thus consciousness itself is simply the immanent actual real >> presence >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > reality, whereas the information structures of the contents of >> >> >> > conscious >> >> >> > are >> >> >> > due to information computations of the brain interacting with >> >> >> > information >> >> >> > from external reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> So what you're saying is: stuff is conscious, stuff is complex? >> >> >> >> >> >> > This is the best, most convincing theory of consciousness of >> which >> >> >> > I'm >> >> >> > aware. But like most of my theories it requires a big paradigm >> shift >> >> >> > in >> >> >> > understanding since it's a completely new interpretation of >> reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> Edgar, I agree with some of what you say here, but I don't >> understand >> >> >> what the theory is. It feels more like a collection of intuitions. >> Do >> >> >> you think you could make your theory more explicit and precise? >> >> >> >> >> >> Cheers >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Best, >> >> >> > Edgar >> >> >> > >> >> >> > -- >> >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the >> Google >> >> >> > Groups >> >> >> > "Everything List" group. >> >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> >> > send >> >> >> > an >> >> >> > email to [email protected]. >> >> >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >> >> >> > Visit this group at >> <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >> >> >> >> > For more options, visit >> <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out>https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> > Groups >> >> > "Everything List" group. >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> send >> >> > an >> >> > email to [email protected]. >> >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >> > Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >> > For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> an >> > email to [email protected]. >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> > Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to > [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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