It's because you don't listen, and then project that quality onto me. It's very common I've found. Not everyone is that way though. I have many productive conversations with people also. That would be hard to explain if it was my fault.
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 10:28:38 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > Sorry Craig but I find you a simply impossible discussion partner. It > doesn't seem to matter how directly and specifically one tries to put a > point to you; you seem endlessly capable of deflecting, ignoring or just > changing the subject. It's a real pity too that you seem convinced that all > criticisms of your ideas stem from the most primitive misunderstandings - > it stops you from really evaluating the arguments. In fact I'm not > convinced you bring much that's novel to the party (which in itself is no > cause for shame in such a traditionally intractable subject) but your > reluctance to confront the real difficulties faced by your type of theory > makes further discussion too frustrating to sustain, at least for me. Sorry > if that seems harsh, but there it is. Over and out. > > David > On 2 Feb 2014 02:20, "Craig Weinberg" <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:56:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, >>>>>> it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not >>>>>> because >>>>>> their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage >>>>>> point >>>>>> amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating >>>>>> frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each >>>>>> other's >>>>>> presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what >>>>>> is >>>>>> perceived appears mechanical. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that you make your point here. How does "your vantage >>>>> point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame" get around >>>>> anything? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules >>>> are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can >>>> know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The >>>> mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to >>>> physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. >>>> >>> >>> Right, so the mind transcends the limits of the brain in its ability to >>> make contact with physics? Is this supposed to mean that you are capable of >>> thoughts that are not minutely correlated with some behaviour of your >>> brain? If so, how do you explain how those thoughts acquire their >>> "sensitivity to physics" or any purchase on the universe outside the body? >>> >> >> You're framing it so that the brain appears as a viable thing on its own >> rather than as the knot of experience that I'm assuming it is. Physics, in >> my view, is nothing more or less than sense sensing itself. It's not that >> there is not minute correlation, it's that the brain activity correlates to >> nothing unless we import our own experience into the correlation. The >> brain is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having an >> animal's body. A neuron is a character in the experience of those who can >> relate to having a cell, or a group of cells for a body. To be clear, the >> body and brain (as we see them) are just as sensitive to physics as "we" >> are, but "our" view of that sensitivity is not direct. Our body filters, >> our brain filters, parts of ourselves are filtered, but part of us is >> unfiltered, and that is 'who' we are. Not a what, or a how, or a why, but >> irreducibly a personal experience of who. Who is the direct (if limited and >> privatized) experience of physics (sense). The what and how of public >> bodies is public physics (indirect sense). >> >> >> >>>> >>>>> ISTM rather that "the quality of what is perceived appears >>>>> mechanical" because when placed under examination at any scale it can be >>>>> observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the >>>>> ones we group under the heading of "physical"). >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an >>>> alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would >>>> conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because >>>> they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is >>>> not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You >>>> could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see >>>> nothing very interesting. >>>> >>> >>> But that, my dear Craig, is my very point, don't you see? Because >>> amongst those "uninteresting" behaviours is the ability to lay claim to the >>> possession of those very aesthetic experiences and those selfsame >>> epiphanies. >>> >> >> I'm saying that there are no uninteresting behaviors at all. It is not >> accessible from the outside. If it were not for the fact that we can >> correlate our own conscious experience with exotic magnetic resonance >> distribution patterns in the brain, something like a brain would seem no >> more worthy of inspection than the small intestine. It is like looking for >> the meaning of Shakespeare only in the grammar and punctuation of the play. >> It's the wrong place to look. The meaning is not visible there. >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>> In effect, it appears to be a "mechanism" at all scales. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Appears. What about feels? Why would mechanisms have an experience that >>>> feels like something? >>>> >>> >>> And there you have it! My point exactly - why indeed? But you would have >>> been more correct to say "why would mechanisms *claim* to have an >>> experience that feels like something". And, a fortiori, how? Don't look >>> away - this is the POPJ. >>> >> >> I'm not talking about the claim though. It doesn't make sense to claim >> something that cannot exist to begin with. I'm saying that experience >> cannot be invented in a mechanistic universe. It doesn't have a function. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> The inexorable progress of this analysis of physical appearances has >>>>> so far trumped every historical attempt to interpolate novel "top-down" >>>>> rules operating at other levels (spiritualism, vitalism, holism, dualism >>>>> etc.). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because it is looking for the head (temporary experiences) at the tail >>>> end (bodies in space). They are aesthetically orthogonal views. If you >>>> measure something with an instrument, you can only measure the outside of >>>> the instrument interacting with the outside of another body. The result is >>>> an inside out view of the universe. >>>> >>> >>> True, but that inside-out view must be intelligibly correlated - and in >>> astoundingly-precise detail at that - with the outside-in view. >>> >> >> It doesn't correlate directly, it correlates orthogonally. Think of how >> metaphor works. Literally "high" as in vertical distance is not >> mechanically related to figuratively "high" as in important, prestigious, >> etc. You have to live as a creature who experiences the nexus of >> overlapping conditions and experiences related to height over many >> lifetimes to reveal that underlying connection. If you look at the >> inside-out picture of ion channels or spike trains, you will not only be >> unable of finding the metaphor or the literal meaning, you'll find a >> completely other sensibility which relates to the human experience from an >> utterly impersonal and trivial perspective. It is to try to appreciate the >> paintings in the Louvre by counting the number of visitors who see it. >> >> >>> Else you are hard pressed to explain why they appear to co-vary in such >>> exquisite detail. >>> >> >> They co-vary because they are orthogonal presentations of the same >> underlying sense. >> >> I model it this >> way:<http://24.media.tumblr.com/bd10bf734b688a82a71112ba087f675e/tumblr_mxx20duols1qeenqko2_r1_1280.jpg> >> >> >> The emergence of the POPJ in both theories is a sign that neither a >>> purely outside-in, nor a purely inside-out theory, can do the job of >>> correlating consciousness with the appearance of mechanism. >>> >> >> I agree, we need to correlate them, but not mechanically because they are >> absolutely orthogonal. We have to meet our naive experience halfway and >> resist our conditioning to reduce it to the post-Enlightenment 3p view. >> Metaphor is the key. Etymology and semiotics help too. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> Comp, as I've said, at the least confronts the problem and offers the >>>>> possible shape of a solution (but that alone, of course, doesn't >>>>> guarantee >>>>> its correctness). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Comp is almost correct, but at the absolute level, when it comes >>>> to putting the horse of sense before the cart of information, it gets it >>>> exactly wrong. >>>> >>> >>> Only if you impose your particular prejudices on it by fiat. >>> >> >> Not at all. There is no prejudice in my view. I don't care whether >> computation or sensation is primary, it just happens to be the case that it >> is not possible for computation to be primary. I arrive at this hypothesis >> by understanding, not judging or prejudging, and I submit it by proposal, >> not fiat. >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>> The value of any genuinely new insight (Relativity Theory, for >>>>> example) is not in ignoring the previous theory (Newtonian mechanics in >>>>> this case) but rather in providing a better explanation for the >>>>> predictions >>>>> of the old theory whilst simultaneously making new and surprising ones >>>>> that >>>>> turn out to match observation better. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This is not about making predictions, although someone could take it in >>>> that directions. This is about understanding the nature of consciousness >>>> and physics. >>>> >>> >>> Which as I've said must correlate the two whilst eliminating neither. >>> >> >> I agree, but they cannot be correlated directly because they relate to >> the opposite orientation. What must be correlated is that they can never be >> correlated, except in meaningless ways. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Consequently, if your theory is to prevail, it must be able to explain >>>>> why appearance - and especially the appearance of "conscious" behaviour, >>>>> not excluding your own - conforms to "physical" causation as precisely as >>>>> we observe. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because observation is a narrow constraint on sense which is invariably >>>> reflected in the result of the observation. Why do the Blind Men each >>>> conclude that the elephant is a different thing? You are underestimating >>>> the depth of the pansensitivity that I'm proposing - which is what I have >>>> come to expect. Turning your model of the universe inside out takes some >>>> practice. When I say that sense is Absolutely Primordial, I mean that >>>> nothing - not appearances, not realism, not sanity or logic - nothing >>>> whatsoever is anything except a local feature within it. >>>> >>> >>> I'm not surprised that you have come to expect incomprehension if the >>> best you can do is complain that people "underestimate the depth" of your >>> theory. >>> >> >> You misinterpret my comment. It is not my theory that you are >> underestimating, it is the phenomena itself that my hypothesis tries to >> define which you are trying to fit into an all-too-traditional framework. >> I'm not complaining, I'm informing you that you are criticizing a straw >> man, not my actual view. >> >> >>> It might help if you could actually point out what specifically is to be >>> found in the hidden depths of pansensitivity >>> >> >> It's not that they are hidden, it is that they have no exterior. Deep, >> shallow, opposite, same, everything, nothing...they are all 100% dependent >> on sense. >> >> >>> that is an adequate response to the specific points I've been making. >>> Poetry is not science and a metaphorical aside about Blind Men is not a >>> reasoned argument. >>> >> >> Reasoned arguments cannot bring someone back from the dead. I'm talking >> about what consciousness actually is. You either want to understand it, or >> you want to make a pretty theory and impress yourself. >> >> >>> >>>> This physical conformity of appearance is the reason that the theory >>>> cannot avoid the POPJ - in essence that we don't need, or seem even be >>>> able >>>> to apply, the notion of consciousness or sense to explain why the >>>> creatures >>>> that appear to us - including ourselves - make the claims to those >>>> phenomena that they do. What you say above doesn't suffice to address this >>>> formidable issue at all. >>>> >>> >>> It's not formidable if you bite the bullet and actually consider the >>> sense primitive without equivocating. Once you see that logic is a kind of >>> sense but sense is not a kind of logic, then everything falls into place >>> nicely. As long as you try to force the concrete presence of sensation and >>> sense-making into an abstract theory, the hard problem will always be >>> formidable. >>> >> >>> I will be more than happy to see that sense is not a kind of logic if >> you can explain *with accompanying details* how this answers my arguments. >> >> Phenomenal judgment is not a paradox in MSR because reference is not >> taken literally. Nothing literally represents anything, it can only be seem >> to represent something else figuratively. Thoughts are experiences. The >> contents of thoughts are not other experiences, they are still just >> thoughts. Nobody lives in them. That's not the reason that sense is not a >> kind of logic though - there's other reasons for that. >> >> I would also thank you to point out in exactly what points you think >> I've been equivocating. Trouble is, I fear you'll just say that since sense >> isn't a kind of logic there's no logical account that can be given of it. >> Well, I guess that means that those of us unwilling to pluck out the eyes >> of our reason will have to resign ourselves to remaining outside your state >> of grace in this regard. >> >> We can give logical accounts of sense because we are directly familiar >> with it. We don't need to give a sensible account of logic because logic >> already rests on the faculties of sense. We don't have to learn what pain >> means. We don't have to give a logical account of it, or understand >> logically how it controls our behavior rather than merely informs it. >> >> There is no substitute for experience David. All that I am doing is >> factoring that into the equation and realizing that it means that all forms >> of logic are incomplete and supervene on sense, while sense itself cannot >> supervene on anything. There can be no Ur-pain which teaches us how to find >> pain painful, because it would require an Ur-ur-pain to teach us that. >> Sooner or later something has to make sense of something, and it doesn't >> matter what level it occurs, because logic doesn't need it. >> >> What you are equivocating on is actually considering the sense primitive: >> "I will be more than happy to see that sense is not a kind of logic if..." >> >> There is no if. Understanding the hypothesis requires that you accept it >> hypothetically from the start, not folding your arms and saying "show me >> the result". >> >> Craig >> >> >> David >> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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