On Monday, February 3, 2014 2:57:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 02 Feb 2014, at 19:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 2, 2014 4:36:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 01 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:16:43 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:13, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> > Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no >>>>> >>>>> > program or data is input and from which no data is expected as >>>>> output? >>>>> >>>>> The UD. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Isn't everything output from the UD? >>>> >>>> >>>> No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. "everything >>>> physical and theological" appears through its intensional activity. >>>> >>> >>> >>> "Appears" = output. >>> >>> >>> "Appears to me" appears more like input to me. Output of of some >>> universe? >>> >>> Input/output, like hardware/software are important distinction, but yet >>> they are relative. My output to you is your input, for example. They are >>> indexicals too. >>> >> >> Sure, but they are absolute within a given frame of reference. >> >> >> That's my point. >> > > It seemed like the point you were making is that appearances were inputs > rather than outputs so it would agree with what you were saying earlier > about the UD not having any outputs. I was making the point that in order > for anything to have an input in a universe where the UD is calling the > shots, then the UD has to be outputting computations to then non-UD (which > receives them as inputs). > > > Why? >
Because otherwise we would be controlling the UD as much as it controls us. > > > > The larger point though is that input and output themselves (which I see > as the sensory motive primitive that information exists *within*) is > overlooked and taken for granted in comp. > > > The input output relations are simulated within the activity of the UD. As > I said the UD itself has no input and no outputs. > > What does a simulation do exactly, and how can there be any 'doing' which isn't really an output? Can a simulation really exist other than as an input which has been output from beyond the simulation? > > > > > >> >> >> You cannot write a program which bypasses the need for inputs and outputs >> by substituting them for a different kind of function. It goes back to what >> I keep saying about not being able to substitute software for a cell phone >> charger or a video monitor, or the difference between playing a sport and >> playing a game which simulates a sport. >> >> >> But then you are the one making an absolute difference here, which >> contradicts you point above. >> > > The difference is absolute when we are talking about the primordial case. > The magnetic North pole of the compass actually points to the South pole of > Earth's magnetic field, but if we are talking about the magnetic field, we > do not say that the difference between North and South pole is relative. > That's all academic though, my point was that Comp does not recognize its > own North and South pole, which is part of why it cannot see that it is > only an object within sense which reflects it rather than the source of > sense. > > > That is far to vague. > I don't think that it is. If we are talking about magnetism in general, then North and South poles are absolutes. If we are talking about a particular magnet then they are relative in one sense and absolute in another. Polarity itself is a relation which reflects the absolute. > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal >>> machines can compute all computable functions, but they can all compute >>> them in all the possible ways to compute them. The intensional CT can be >>> derived from the usual extensional CT. Universal machines computes all >>> functions, but also in all the same and infinitely many ways. >>> >> >> How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output? >> >> >> >> Oh! It is a bit perverse to input the output, but of course that's what >> we do when we combine two machines to get a new one. Like getting a NAND >> gate from a NOT and a AND gates. >> >> We can also input to a machine its own input, which is even more >> perverse, and usually this leads to interesting "fixed points", many simple >> iterations leads to chaos. The Mandelbrot set illustrates this. >> >> But the point is that we don't have to feed the program at the bottom >> level, if you can imagine that 17 is prime independently of you, then >> arithmetic feeds all programs all by itself, independently of you. >> >> This is not entirely obvious, and rather tedious and long to prove but >> follows from elementary computer science. >> > > The arithmetic truth of 17 being prime doesn't do anything though. That > fact needs to be used in the context of some processing of an input to > produce an output. > > > So you refer to extrinsic processing, but that contradicts your (correct) >> phenomenological account of sense, >> > > I'm not talking about my view of sense, I'm talking about my understanding > of your view of the UD, arithmetic truth, and comp (which are not a part of > my view at all). > > > You can't criticize a theory by using another theory. That is called > begging a question. > How else can you criticize a theory? > > > > and that jeopardize the possibility their primitiveness, or as David >> shown, you are back to the POPJ. >> > > In my view, all of arithmetic and processing is subordinate to the > sensory-motive primitive (the silhouette of which could be translated as > I/O in information-theoretic terms). > > > That is a reiteration of your view, not a critic of another view. > It's a criticism of views that assume that sensory-motive I/O phenomena can be an exhaust of information processing. > > > To me, everything is intrinsic, and extrinsicity is a perceptual > contraction. > > > You know that this is a consequence of comp, concerning the physical > reality. But we have still an extrinsic general conception of the > ontological reality (like arithmetic). Without it, your position is a form > of solipsism, and of abandon of the idea of searching an explanation for > sense. > The primordial nature of sense IS the explanation for sense. Without a sense primitive your position is a form of nilipsism, and you abandon the idea of searching for an explanation for numbers. > > I don't get why POPJ would apply to MSR at all, it seems to me just a > criticism (and a valid one) of functionalism and dualism. I use PIP which > is a Tesselated or Ouroboran Monism. > > > It does no work if your theory can justify the appearance of the extrinsic. > The extrinsic is justified as scaffolding and bricks are justified by the Empire State building. > But you are unclear about this, and I'm afraid you have to be unclear, > because by starting from sense, you start from something which is > notoriously unclear. > Clarity is derived from the more primitive sense, which supplies the possibility of clarity, unclarity, and the differential of qualities in between. > Then in some posts you continue to talk like if a physical universe > exists. What is PIP? Comp is OK with Ouroboran Monism. After Gödel > arithmetic instantiates clearly many form of such type of monism. > PIP = Primordial Identity Pansensitivity http://multisenserealism.com/glossary/pansensitivity-pip-msr/ Craig > > Bruno > > Bruno > > > > > > > Craig > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a >>>> > meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there would >>>> > be no inputting and outputting, only instantaneous results within a >>>> > Platonic ocean of arithmetic truth. >>>> >>>> >>>> A computation of a program without input can simulate different >>>> programs having many inputs relative to other programs or divine (non- >>>> machines) things living in arithmetic >>>> >>> >>> How does the program itself get to be a program without being input? >>> >>> >>> OK. Good question. >>> >>> The answer is that the TOE has to choose an initial universal system. I >>> use arithmetic (RA). >>> >>> Then all programs or number are natural inputs of the (tiny) >>> arithmetical truth which emulates them. >>> >>> You need to understand that a tiny part of arithmetic defines all >>> partial computable relations. The quintessence of this is already in Gödel >>> 1931. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > Where do we find input and output within arithmetic though? >>>> >>>> It is not obvious, but the sigma_1 arithmetical relation emulates all >>>> computations, with all sort of relative inputs. >>>> >>> >>> It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/o is >>> taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in mathematical >>> terms. >>> >>> >>> It is the argument of the functions in the functional relations. >>> >>> If phi_i(j) = k then RA can prove that there is a number i which applied >>> to j will give k, relatively to some universal u, (and this "trivially" >>> relatively to arithmetic). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > What makes it happen without invoking a physical or experiential >>>> > context? >>>> >>>> Truth. The necessary one, and the contingent one. >>>> >>> >>> Does truth make things happen? >>> >>> >>> Yes. truth('p') -> p. >>> If "Obama is president" is true, then Obama is president. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> > As an aside, its interesting to play with the idea of building a >>>> > view of computation from a sensory-motive perspective. When we use a >>>> >>>> > computer to automate mental tasks it could be said that we are >>>> > 'unputting' the effort that would have been required otherwise. When >>>> >>>> > we use a machine to emulate our own presence in our absence, such as >>>> >>>> > a Facebook profile, we are "onputting" ourselves in some digital >>>> > context. >>>> >>>> The brain does that a lot. Nature does that a lot. Ah! The natural >>>> numbers does that I lot. >>>> >>> >>> There doesn't seem to be a clear sense of what it means for numbers to >>> exert effort. >>> >>> >>> Of course I was speaking loosely, to avoid too much long sentences. It >>> is not the number which makes the effort, but the person emulated by the >>> number relations which makes the effort. >>> Think about the number relation which emulates the Milky way (by >>> computing the evolution of its Heisenberg matrix, with 10^1000 exact >>> decimal, at the subplack level. Of course that is already a toy >>> mulit-galaxies. It owns a Craig doing the effort to read this post, and omp >>> prevents that you can distinguish your self from that one. the effort are >>> the same. (Of course with non-comp, you can made him into a zombie). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If, as you say, truth itself makes things happen, then it would seem >>> that effort is an incoherent concept. >>> >>> >>> My poor car followed the schroedinger equation without effort, but at a >>> higher level, it tooks her a lot of effort to climb some steep roads. Well, >>> she died through such effort, actually. >>> >>> >>> >>> Numbers have no reason to make other numbers do their work, as they >>> don't seem to have any basis to distinguish work from play. >>> >>> >>> Sigma_1 arithmetic, alias the UD, emulates all possible interactions >>> between all possible universal machines. All sorts of interactions are >>> emulated, but with different relative probabilities, and that depends >>> locally partially on them. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Computers will evolve in two ways: users' self extensions, like a neo- >>>> neo-cortex (+GSM, GPS, glasses, etc), which is a semi-delegation, and >>>> the total delegation (the friendly, and not friendly, AIs). >>>> >>> >>> Those are ways that our use of computers will evolve. I don't see that >>> computers have any desire to extend themselves or to delegate their work. >>> >>> >>> All universal machine are incomplete. Of course "desire" is a high level >>> feature which requires probably deep computations, but that desire is a >>> logical consequence of the basic frustration of any machine when she grasps >>> the difference between what she can obtained, and what she can dream about. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
