On 03 Feb 2014, at 15:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 3, 2014 2:57:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Feb 2014, at 19:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 2, 2014 4:36:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:16:43 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
"Appears" = output.
"Appears to me" appears more like input to me. Output of of some
universe?
Input/output, like hardware/software are important distinction,
but yet they are relative. My output to you is your input, for
example. They are indexicals too.
Sure, but they are absolute within a given frame of reference.
That's my point.
It seemed like the point you were making is that appearances were
inputs rather than outputs so it would agree with what you were
saying earlier about the UD not having any outputs. I was making
the point that in order for anything to have an input in a universe
where the UD is calling the shots, then the UD has to be outputting
computations to then non-UD (which receives them as inputs).
Why?
Because otherwise we would be controlling the UD as much as it
controls us.
?
We have non control on the UD, like we have non control on the
distribution of primes. The UD and its work (UD*) is entirely
determined by the laws of addition and multiplication.
The larger point though is that input and output themselves (which
I see as the sensory motive primitive that information exists
*within*) is overlooked and taken for granted in comp.
The input output relations are simulated within the activity of the
UD. As I said the UD itself has no input and no outputs.
What does a simulation do exactly, and how can there be any 'doing'
which isn't really an output? Can a simulation really exist other
than as an input which has been output from beyond the simulation?
The UD generates the programs in the order of their length, and in
alphabetical order when they have the same length.
Let us take the UD generating programs without input, like the program
computing functions on (all) fixed argument:
P_0, P_1, P_2, ....
The UD generates them, and dovetail on their finite piece of executions:
P_0 1th step of execution
P_1 1th step of execution
P_0 2th step of execution
P_1 2th step of execution
P_2 1th step of execution
P_0 3th step of execution
P_1 3th step of execution
P_2 2th step of execution
P_3 1th step of execution
P_0 4th step of execution
P_1 4th step of execution
...
In that way, would some computation not halt, we will not been stuck
in that computations. In case each programs has one input, we would
dovetail on the inputs themselves, in the same manner (but actually
that is not necessary: it is equivalent to dovetail on a a one input-
programs and its input, as on the no-input-programs having fixed inputs.
All those steps are intrinsically realized by the consequence of
addition and multiplication in arithmetic, so that if you are OK that
"17 is prime" is true independently of you, then all the truth
corresponding to each line in the dovetailing above is realized in
some true simple arithmetical sentences. This gives, inside
arithmetic, the entire dovetailing.
You, as a Turing machine, have no means to distinguish if you are
supported by some "real computations", or by a computation existing in
arithmetic, and you next immediate states is determined by all
computations in the UD going through your actual states. That is why
we will have to recover the physical by a relative measure on all
computations.
OK?
You cannot write a program which bypasses the need for inputs and
outputs by substituting them for a different kind of function. It
goes back to what I keep saying about not being able to substitute
software for a cell phone charger or a video monitor, or the
difference between playing a sport and playing a game which
simulates a sport.
But then you are the one making an absolute difference here, which
contradicts you point above.
The difference is absolute when we are talking about the primordial
case. The magnetic North pole of the compass actually points to the
South pole of Earth's magnetic field, but if we are talking about
the magnetic field, we do not say that the difference between North
and South pole is relative. That's all academic though, my point
was that Comp does not recognize its own North and South pole,
which is part of why it cannot see that it is only an object within
sense which reflects it rather than the source of sense.
That is far to vague.
I don't think that it is. If we are talking about magnetism in
general, then North and South poles are absolutes. If we are talking
about a particular magnet then they are relative in one sense and
absolute in another. Polarity itself is a relation which reflects
the absolute.
May be, but all this does not prevent the UD to work without outputs,
nor inputs.
Now you can consider a UD as generating the set of lines above, and I
will not be sick if you call them outputs. That is not important and
can be considered as implementations details. This will not change the
relative measure, if it exists.
In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all
universal machines can compute all computable functions, but they
can all compute them in all the possible ways to compute them.
The intensional CT can be derived from the usual extensional CT.
Universal machines computes all functions, but also in all the
same and infinitely many ways.
How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output?
Oh! It is a bit perverse to input the output, but of course that's
what we do when we combine two machines to get a new one. Like
getting a NAND gate from a NOT and a AND gates.
We can also input to a machine its own input, which is even more
perverse, and usually this leads to interesting "fixed points",
many simple iterations leads to chaos. The Mandelbrot set
illustrates this.
But the point is that we don't have to feed the program at the
bottom level, if you can imagine that 17 is prime independently of
you, then arithmetic feeds all programs all by itself,
independently of you.
This is not entirely obvious, and rather tedious and long to prove
but follows from elementary computer science.
The arithmetic truth of 17 being prime doesn't do anything though.
That fact needs to be used in the context of some processing of an
input to produce an output.
So you refer to extrinsic processing, but that contradicts your
(correct) phenomenological account of sense,
I'm not talking about my view of sense, I'm talking about my
understanding of your view of the UD, arithmetic truth, and comp
(which are not a part of my view at all).
You can't criticize a theory by using another theory. That is called
begging a question.
How else can you criticize a theory?
By working in that theory, and finding an internal contradiction or a
contradiction with some facts.
and that jeopardize the possibility their primitiveness, or as
David shown, you are back to the POPJ.
In my view, all of arithmetic and processing is subordinate to the
sensory-motive primitive (the silhouette of which could be
translated as I/O in information-theoretic terms).
That is a reiteration of your view, not a critic of another view.
It's a criticism of views that assume that sensory-motive I/O
phenomena can be an exhaust of information processing.
To me, everything is intrinsic, and extrinsicity is a perceptual
contraction.
You know that this is a consequence of comp, concerning the physical
reality. But we have still an extrinsic general conception of the
ontological reality (like arithmetic). Without it, your position is
a form of solipsism, and of abandon of the idea of searching an
explanation for sense.
The primordial nature of sense IS the explanation for sense.
This like saying that the explanation of why we see a moon is that we
see that there is a moon. That sort of explanation is not satisfactory
for me.
Without a sense primitive your position is a form of nilipsism,
It would be if sense was eliminated.
But not only sense is not eliminated, but it acquires some role and it
becomes justified by solid atemporal truth.
and you abandon the idea of searching for an explanation for numbers.
Yes, but I know that there are none. If you can derive "the program
P_789 has not stopped at his 34900067552231 steps" from less than
addition and multiplication (or less than combinator abstraction and
application, ...) then you show me the details on this. But in fact I
can prove to you that this is just impossible.
The numbers remains mysterious, but that fact is not a mystery, and it
reflects the "well known" failure of logicism. We cannot derive the
numbers laws from something not Turing complete.
I use arithmetic, but the real conceptual assumption is the assumption
that there is at least one universal machine (that's a weakening of
Church thesis).
I don't get why POPJ would apply to MSR at all, it seems to me just
a criticism (and a valid one) of functionalism and dualism. I use
PIP which is a Tesselated or Ouroboran Monism.
It does no work if your theory can't justify the appearance of the
extrinsic.
The extrinsic is justified as scaffolding and bricks are justified
by the Empire State building.
That's a local metaphor, but comp explains where the brick and the
scaffolding appear. How do you justify that from sense only?
But you are unclear about this, and I'm afraid you have to be
unclear, because by starting from sense, you start from something
which is notoriously unclear.
Clarity is derived from the more primitive sense, which supplies the
possibility of clarity, unclarity, and the differential of qualities
in between.
Your notion of sense is too much fuzzy: it looks like it justifies
everything, but without explanation of how it does that, and why the
illusion of matter is persistent, etc.
Then in some posts you continue to talk like if a physical universe
exists. What is PIP? Comp is OK with Ouroboran Monism. After Gödel
arithmetic instantiates clearly many form of such type of monism.
PIP = Primordial Identity Pansensitivity
http://multisenserealism.com/glossary/pansensitivity-pip-msr/
I see prose, not a theory in the common sense of the term.
It is disturbing that you get negative results on other theories, when
starting from some unclear principles.
Even if I could make sense of your "sense", which I honestly do not, I
could not make sense of why this distinguish a priori silicon and
carbon creatures.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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