On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
<snip>
It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real
physics.
hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.
So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is
false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not
by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done
by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).
You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus
+ we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated
at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before,
but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy).
So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears
to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.
Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe
then it cannot confirm comp.
I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way,
comp".
No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we
observe cannot count in favor of comp.
According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We
could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake
sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make
sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that
much.
Anyway, as we get a quantum logic, and many-worlds, what we observe
today can count as much in favor of comp than of QM.
Then you have the empirical reason in favor of comp, like the
intuition provided by molecular biology.
The real point is that what we observe might refute comp, like it
might refute QM.
Bruno
Brent
Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the
same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but
that we cannot know we are awake.
This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or
of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this.
(Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm
definitively *any* theory about reality).
Bruno
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