On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > >> >> On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >> >>> >>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> > <snip> > > > It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. > > > > > hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. > > > So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly > (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are > dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented > on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole > UD in a non computable). > > You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we > are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher > level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come > back, as this is not so easy). > > > So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true > but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp > is a dream or simulation at a higher level. > > Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it > cannot confirm comp. > > > I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp". > > > No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe > cannot count in favor of comp. > Not strongly, I suppose. But I still find it perplexing that we can send electricity through a CPU with memory, given foundations of some interpretation of QM, and that certain properties of arithmetic can be realized and exploited on a higher level to yield the working languages and GUIs that most people use today, not to speak of informing and underpinning so many scientific models, even if Bruno notes correctly that we don't employ self-reference above some use of recursion in a very confined sense. All these attacks for "metaphysics, soft philosophy bullshit" ignore the thing you are typing on and viewing at this very moment, and the arithmetic properties at work in so many scientific models. That these models, the wealth of technologies we derive with arithmetic in hand... or that PCs for instance, work at all, given some interpretation of QM as a base, is just plain weird/amazing. Definitive proof for comp? Of course not. But "just metaphysics" will force you into "being metaphysical", when you push the button and boot your system. As if some metaphysical connotation bars an idea/person of being fruitful to science or our immediate practical lives a priori: where's the proof of this btw? It seems more to confirm a physicalist bias, when we just don't know. As a musician, my bias is supported by the fact that I count all day; meeting the felicity conditions of getting my ratios right on all levels I can parse, say while improvising or teaching, gives me paychecks. So much for "comp not working- its just a vain metaphysical tool for retro-explanations". Sure, if you want. Currently I just don't swing that way. I need a beat and some groove. PGC > > Brent > > > Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as > the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know > we are awake. > This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of > Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this. > (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively > *any* theory about reality). > > Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
