On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]>>:


    On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




    2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>>:


        On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:

        On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
        <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

            On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
            That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated 
in
            some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
            Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree 
this is
            a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for 
all
            universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different 
geographies.


        So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, 
according to
        comp?

        Not completely, as you will still have all the computations 
approximating all
        possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and 
in that
        sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not be first person 
plural
        sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics 
below our
        substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations,
        something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can 
depend
        if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so that 
the
        computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise
        subdovetailing, for example.




        So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows 
them to
        exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)

        Is that not tautological?



        If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early 
universe in
        which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create 
it
        (somehow) ?

        We select them. See above.




            You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test.
            Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
            evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much
            more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and 
it is
            enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to 
refute
            comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not
            anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to 
step 8,
            and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we 
have to
            do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to 
continue the
            discussion in decent condition.

        I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
        "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"

        This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But
        thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we 
can
        observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is 
the only
        theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp 
predicts one
        precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what 
we
        observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the
        comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.


    I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because 
whatever you
    could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and so comp is 
always in
    accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a
    specific thing that would invalidate comp ?

    If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into 
CPL, then
    comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything 
would
    be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel" in the
    universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent.

    This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided"  
(page 47):

    "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds 
for the
    actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of 
affairs".

    Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those
    observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws 
means
    that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if 
that
    set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, 
that is are
    true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.



But it can't be true everywhere with comp,



It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp) physical 
reality.


because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality).... hence, that "virtual" world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)...

It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.




hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.

So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).

You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy).

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.

Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot 
confirm comp.

Brent


In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses information, without justifying its existence and the modality of the compression, still less justifying a non communicable part of it (the physical sensation) or linking sensation and bodies in ad hoc ways without taking the FPI into account. With comp we don't have so much choice. That we might be dreaming is also true for physics (and that's why I often forget to mention the higher level dream, when I say that comp is refutable---that is universally true).

Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we are not dreaming or in a simulation.

Bruno

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