The duplication of human beings, such a significant prediction of comp, should then be amenable to test- using mice of course.
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 1:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > 2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > >> On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >> >>> >>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. >>>> >>>> >>>> So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly >>>> (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are >>>> dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented >>>> on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole >>>> UD in a non computable). >>>> >>> >>> I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure >>> you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. >>> >>> >>> I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical. >>> I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I >>> measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, >>> but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the >>> modal logic brought by the intensional variants. >>> Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all >>> geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest will be >>> sort of contingencies. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we >>>> are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher >>>> level). OK? >>>> >>> >>> Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics" >>> is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. >>> >>> >>> Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be >>> tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being not >>> implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This >>> makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus >>> pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). >>> >>> But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of comp >>> + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to >>> Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an >>> (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. >>> If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can >>> derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and >>> compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and >>> my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the >>> correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't >>> mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude >>> that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). >>> >> >> As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim >> a discrepancy... you can't do that... >> >> >> I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the >> physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the >> correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment >> does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. >> > > That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see > as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would > be able to falsify comp, please be precise. > > >> >> >> >> Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, >> >> >> It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is >> already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). >> >> >> the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply >> that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of >> computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here... >> >> >> The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the >> artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does >> not result from the interference below the subst. level. >> > > It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from > an infinity of computations... so it is below the substitution level, > because the level is finite or comp is false. > > >> >> If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, >> > > How would it proves that ? It can't, the proof is that there *can be* > environments where F!=ma which also results from an infinity of > computations. > > >> it will looks "dreamy" to me, >> > > No argument there proving that. > > >> I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see >> the discrepancy. >> > > You still haven't show of what consist comp physical reality beside vague > manyworld like prediction... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> so by the same point as our "real" world, a conscious being in my virtual >> world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the >> next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the consistent >> extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true... hence F=m*a cannot >> be universal in this context and cannot be use to invalidate comp... so as >> long as you can't say precisely what kind of measurement would invalidate >> comp or what exactly comp physics encompass (IMO not much except >> multiplicity of worlds), I can't see a way to falsify it, and certainly not >> by a measurement. If you think otherwise, please state what kind of >> measurement you think would qualify. >> >> >> *All* physical measurement can refute comp V simulation in principle, as >> anything physical can be both derived in comp, and then tested. >> > > Seems totally bogus... no measurement can do that... that's on your > shoulder to prove otherwise... > > Regards, > Quentin > > >> >> Of course, if there were no physical laws, and that all number relations >> measured by physicists are contingent, then that would be a pity for the >> notion of physical laws. But then comp would predict that those >> geographical laws have to be accessible and we should be able to derive >> information on those relations. It would just made the multiverse very >> smooth, and its global mathematical structure should still be derivable >> from comp and arithmetic, although the testing would been harder to >> do. The logic of Matter (observable) would be equal to the logic of Thought >> (boolean logic, classical logic, Boole laws of thought). >> >> Empirically, we don't see that at all, and empirically we have introduced >> the notion of physical *law*, and indeed those laws on the observable are >> obeying a non boolean logic, quantum logic. >> >> And then qZ1*, the comp logic of the observation with probability one >> (which empirically obeys a quantum logic) does NOT collapse into classical >> logic, and does obey a quantum logic. >> So comp guaranties that there are quantum physical laws, correct for all >> geographies, again (point above) under the condition they emerge *directly* >> from the sum on all computations, and not from the dream or simulation of a >> universal machine supported by that geography. >> >> You can in principle derived from all finite multiverse which consists in >> counter example to negated theorem of qZ1* build a graph of Stern Gerlach >> device refuting comp. We can compare the empirical quantum logics with the >> comp quantum logic. Up to now it fits. >> It would not have fitted, I would have concluded, from comp, that we are >> in a normal, artificial simulation, like Boström, or like Tipler Omega >> point. But apparently, until now, nature conforms to the comp quantum logic >> and mathematics. >> >> OK? >> >> Let me speculate. I would not been astonished that the physics derived >> from comp will be a quantum mathematics, with quantum numbers, and that >> physics will be a sort of quantum group theory, and that some group can >> manage the inflation of realities (like the unitary group, by introducing a >> phase to the computations, and eliminates the extravagant more lengthy (in >> the UD) path. I expect the SWE, or Dirac, or DeWitt-Wheeler equation, but >> the Hamiltonian might be contingent, or geographical, even if cosmic. The >> quantum vacuum does look like a quantum universal dovetailer. But here I >> speculate. >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Regards, >> Quentin >> >> >>> Then by being a classical computationalist (meaning that I bet strongly >>> on comp and the S4 theory of knowledge), I can bet as much strongly that I >>> am failed by some people through a simulation, a bit like in some dream we >>> can become lucid by keeping attention to the detail of the dream. Can you >>> find something equivalent for Peter Jones "realness"? I doubt so. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>> >>>> (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as >>>> this is not so easy). >>>> >>>> In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses >>>> information, without justifying its existence and the modality of the >>>> compression, still less justifying a non communicable part of it (the >>>> physical sensation) or linking sensation and bodies in ad hoc ways without >>>> taking the FPI into account. With comp we don't have so much choice. That >>>> we might be dreaming is also true for physics (and that's why I often >>>> forget to mention the higher level dream, when I say that comp is >>>> refutable---that is universally true). >>>> >>>> Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we are >>>> not dreaming or in a simulation. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Quentin >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation >>>>> does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or >>>>> physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many-worlds >>>>> aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level, and the >>>>> existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I >>>>> would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible. >>>>> >>>>> But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to >>>>> infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's >>>>> inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it is still open >>>>> if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable, despite the fact that Z1* >>>>> is decidable, but it would be miraculous that Z1* proves it, for some >>>>> reason to lengthy to develop here). But the point is that if Z1* proves >>>>> that Bell inequality, then the fact that nature violates it would refute >>>>> comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire >>>>> quantum logic, so we can compare directly the quantum logics and the >>>>> quantum logic of comp. >>>>> >>>>> Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use >>>>> quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form of >>>>> quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a quantum NOR. >>>>> All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can test the existence of >>>>> quantum computation in Z1* (or in his quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine >>>>> that someone can prove that qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and >>>>> imagine we succeed in implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ >>>>> Theaetetus) is refuted. >>>>> Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which >>>>> shows that the field has progressed, notably with respect of quantum >>>>> computing, and this suggest that the best way to refute comp, or improve >>>>> the knowledge theory, will come from the ability of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or >>>>> qX1*, to simulate a quantum computer. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> (*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum Logic : >>>>> Models and Computational >>>>> Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721–751, 2000. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> Quentin >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's >>>>>> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main >>>>>> line on this. >>>>>> Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>>> . >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>>>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
