On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > > > > >2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > > >On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>>hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. > >> >
... > > >Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, > > It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which > is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). > ... > The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the > artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which > does not result from the interference below the subst. level. > > If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it > will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) > physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. > > F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It is how we define (and operationally measure) "force". If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos", he discusses this from page 48. Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3 momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity approximation. So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law - it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
