On 14 Feb 2014, at 00:50, LizR wrote:
On 14 February 2014 12:46, chris peck <[email protected]>
wrote:
Hi Liz
>>Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we
can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair
splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has
accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible.
my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy
in a universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't
concern technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected
on that score have they?
Some people have objected on the basis that we can't duplicate
people, for example. I think the "expectation value objection" is a
valid one (and Bruno agrees that it is an open problem in comp) - we
have no way to work out what we should expect to see on the basis of
an infinite number of computations (I think the MWI has a similar
problem?)
In a nutshell, MWI has not that problem, intuitively already with
Feynman formulation of QM (see his book on light), or formally
(algebraically) by Gleason Theorem.
In comp it is *the* problem. AUDA consists in some steps toward
formulating the problem and the beginning of a solution, (with a nice
and simple global semantics through the arithmetical interpretation of
Plotinus, but that can make some people nervous).
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we
can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair
splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has
accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. (And
anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above the quantum level
has accepted "Yes Doctor".)
If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust
than "oh but we can't do that (yet) !"
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