On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-02-14 16:49 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:

On 13 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-02-13 21:05 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:

On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:

On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:












hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.

So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).

I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it.

I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants. Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest will be sort of contingencies.





You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK?

Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics" is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient.

Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake).

But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of comp + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation).

As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that...

I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation.

That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise.


But we cannot measure a physical laws. We can only postulate it, and see if our measurement confirms it or not.

Or we can derive laws, from a theory which is postulated.

So from QM, we can derive that the observable obeys a quantum logic.

From comp, we can derive that the observable obeys to some non boolean logic.

Then we can compare the two logics.

Let me give you a specific example. let us take Bell's inequality. A simple form is

(A & B) / (A & C) V (B & ~C) ("/" = we can deduce, I use "/" because it is simpler, you can verify that with "->" in place of "/", we get a tautology, and so that rule is valid in classical logic, by modus ponens).

See my appendices on QM where it is shown how to build Stern Gerlach or polarizers setting showing that this is booean tautology is statistically violated by QM (and nature, even when A and B are quite apart and should be independent). That tautology is not a tautology for quantum logic. QL does not prove, and nature provides counter-example.

Now QL proves a logical formula if and only if the modal logic B proves the quantization of that formula. The quantization is a recursive transformation, where you translate p (in QL) into []<>p in B, and ~p is translated into []~p.

So what I say above can be expressed by the quantization of "(A & B) -> (A & C) V (B & ~C)" is not a theorem of the modal logic B.

The quantization of "(A & B) / (A & C) V (B & ~C)" gives

[]<>A & []<>B / ([]<>A & []<>C) V []<>A & []~([]<>C)).

To refute comp + theaetetus + non-artificial-dream it is enough to see if Z1* proves that formula, or derive that rules. If it does, then it is impossible, in the comp-physics to violate Bell's inequality, and Aspect experience would refute comp or Theatetus or non-simulation.








Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,

It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).


the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here...

The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level.

It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from an infinity of computations...

Yes, but with "F≠ma" simulated on the top.

"an infinity of computations" is not enough, you need *the* infinity of computations consistent with my actual state.

But it is consistent with the actual state of a sentient observer inhabiting such worlds; so F=ma *cannot* be universal as any physical measurement.


If it was, "F=ma" is not a law of physics. You beg the question.

I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point proving our own reality could not be a "dream" in that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality "more" real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false...

Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the "self- multiplication" factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural) protecting comp from solipsism.




All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient being. That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant one.

Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it,

I do. That's what Z1* & Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open problem in math.



you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure battle.

I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine needed to extract the "correct" physics).



Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate computationalism...

Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM makes both physics into a statistics.




computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can be inferred from that.

I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that the "& p" and "p->[]p" seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies.






This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can understand by "introspection" (self-reference) and so the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) from the sum on UD*.



That one is determined by computer science. The case of the "probability one" logic is given by the arithmetical quantization.





so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false.


If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma,

How would it proves that ?

By showing that Z1* gives the good type of quantum logic, enough to assure Gleason theorem, and derive the measure from some canonical (Hilbertian) semantics. Z1* is already able to decide if the Hilbert space is finitely dimension, or infinitely dimensional. Then dimension is related to the probability calculus (by works by many quantum logicians), and normally, arithmetic add infinitely many constraints at the first order modal logic level. It might be hard, but I do thing that qZ1* is able to decide if "F=ma" is valid or not in the worlds of the comp multiverses". Nobody said it was simple, especially that such question is complex for reasonable theorem provers.

[]<>A is written in a Z logic, so in G it is equivalent to []([]A V <>A) & <>([]A V<>A), so the ultimate arithmetical propositions are rather complex.





It can't, the proof is that there *can be* environments where F! =ma which also results from an infinity of computations.

it will looks "dreamy" to me,

No argument there proving that.

I hope that what I explain above has clarified.

No... what you clarified was already known,

I have clarified that Bell's inequality violation is (most plausibly) a law,

if it is "most plausibly", you haven't clarified anything...

For the contingent reason that it is still intractable. But the formal theory and the theorems (or non theorems) are there. And given that B violates the inequality, you can bet that the B^- (B without necessitation) + some arithmetical constraints will violate too.




it is or it isn't but "most plausibly" is not a clarification...

Yes. But that is just an open problem. The theorem prover get a memory overflow, simply. Meanwile, some open questions have been solved, but most others remain.





and that, actually, all quantum tautologies are already either laws or precise open problems, and explained why arithmetic must give all constraints (by UDA) so that some "Gleason theorem" can be used.

I am not sure I understand what you seem missing.

I'm don't feel I'm missing anything, I challenge your view that UDA is falsifiable.

? You mean comp? UDA is a reasoning: it is valid or not. AUDA is the translation in arithmetic. It makes comp + the classical theory of knowledge falsifiable. Indeed physics is entirely given by qZ1* and/or qX1*, with some "harmonic" part given by S4Grz1.

I can hardly imagine something more falsifiable.

In 1991, when I found the "material intelligible and sensible hypostases (the Z and X logic), I predicted that they would be refuted in the year, by me or my students or colleagues. This did not happened, despite their many efforts. Later I predicted it would be refuted by experts in quantum logic before 2000. But up to now, nature confirms the arithmetical quantizations, extracted from S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, and they corroborate formally the fact that the comp laws physics are quantum laws, despite we loose the necessitation rule in the corresponding (to B) modal logic B^-

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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