On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am duplicated both the resulting continuations are equivalent immediately posterior to duplication. Consequently I repeat my question: if *you* were duplicated in this manner, would you reasonably expect that either of the resulting equivalent continuations would experience a two-valued outcome?No, but as I said, that's regarding them as third persons.Well, the very logic of the hypothesis dictates that *both* continuations inherit the first personal perspective of the original and this will always be single-valued. But, as you said, there is an ineliminable ambiguity because neither can record anything first-personal that incorporates that third-personal doubleness. IOW it always seems as if there is only one of me (1p) even in the case that I know there are two of me (3p). Do you agree that this ambiguity is sufficient for step 3 to go through?
You sound as though you want to sell me something. I have no interest buying the argument one piece at a time or swallowing it all at once. I'm interested in understanding it and it's consequences.
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