On 17 Feb 2014, at 03:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2014 6:17 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 01:35, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Well then, facing duplication, would your expectation change to
that of personally experiencing a simultaneous two-valued outcome?
And if the answer is yes, does that imply that you would reject
MWI as a possibility because (I presume) you have never in fact
experienced such an outcome?
I wouldn't say "reject" since it is possible, but MWI is very
different it is just projection onto different orthogonal subspaces
of the Hilbert space. Bruno's teleportation is necessarily
classical and it depends on consciousness being *classically*
duplicated.
So what about the first part of the question?
I don't know what I would personally experience because "I" is
ambiguous after duplication. That's where I think John Clark has a
point about pronouns.
The ambiguity comes from not taking the 1p/3p distinctions only. I do
it, but people complaining about "ambiguity" are the one introducing
it by systematically ignoring that distinction.
Of course Bruno objects that this expectation question is about 1-p
experience.
That's better.
But it is asked of H-man, to whom the M-man and the W-man are like
third persons.
Not necessarily. They are like that in the 3-1 view, but by comp, we
know that they will not be like that from their personal view.
Perhaps it is enough for Bruno's point that the question has no
definite answer - I think he's just trying to motivate indeterminancy.
Exactly. By making vague the pronouns, it looks like an ambiguity, but
*assuming* comp, and using the 1-3 distinction, the ambiguity is no
more ambiguous than in the throwing of a coin, or the measurement of a
spin.
Bruno
Brent
David
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