On 24 February 2014 14:04, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Liz > > *>> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent > to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or > B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident > it duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the > comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this > thought experiment.* > > An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined > result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats > the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p > uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum > coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really > say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI. > Yes, maybe. My idea was that the person thought the outcome was random, but in this particular case it was completely determined - he was duplicated, and sent to both places. The idea was to split out the 1p probability view from the 3p determined view (which might not be realised for a long time, say, until someone eventually worked out what had happened). *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any > disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the > person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should > assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity > criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and > won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what > Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I > think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments > would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. > Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. > Hmm. This was why I was trying to make the 3p certainty unknown to the 1p concerned (though reconstructable at a later date, so one can eventually see that there was a 3p certainty involved). I can't see how Bruno fails to show that probability assignments work in an equivalent manner to to Everett's. If one doesn't know about the duplication then it appears that there is, say, a 50% chance of each outcome; if one does know, there is a 100% chance of the outcome, which involves duplication. Which is how it's supposed to work in the MWI, surely? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
