On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: Hi David, > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote: > > On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures >>> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of >>> me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, >>> retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* >>> >>> Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is >>> any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the >>> person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should >>> assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity >>> criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and >>> won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what >>> Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I >>> think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments >>> would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. >>> Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. >> >> >> Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to >> you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful >> way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to >> be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a >> heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation >> onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this >> perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random >> selection from the class of all possible observer moments. >> >> Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. >> >> If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to >> get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more >> probable than being me or you. >> > > But how would "you" remember that? > > > By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data banks, > or reading book on "my" origin. >
Well, I'm not sure if it makes sense to say the Hoyle's universal observer is the universal machine. I don't know to what extent his idea is compatible with comp. But to be clear, you suggested above that a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you, so I asked you how Bruno, for example, could remember that, meaning to suggest that of course you could not. I suppose it would be some sort of problem for Hoyle's idea if one suspected not simply that certain classes of non-human observer vastly out-numbered human ones, but that they were likely to be asking themselves similar sorts of questions. IOW, what might constitute an appropriate equivalence class for ourselves? > > >> I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a >> notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. >> >> I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a >> universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer >> ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). >> >> But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic >> and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian >> number) will select among all "observer moment". >> > > Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some > relevant sense to eventually in this context. > > > Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism? > Not, I think, in the 1p sense, without a certain amount of equivocation. > There is a sense "God" select them all, but they inter-relations are > indexicals. > Yes, but the inner God cannot select them all simultaneously, without the equivocation to which I refer. > > > > And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical > serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential > because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves. > > > > That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are dualities > between those ways of considering a structure. > > You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of > accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories. > > > > Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow preserved > at the frog level, at the price of breaking the simultaneity of the > momentary views. > > > I am not sure I understand. > I think he is saying (as did Schroedinger) that the frog must see every indexical reality, but cannot see them all simultaneously. > > > > > > >> The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which >> can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its >> first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the >> histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable >> universal neighbors. >> > > Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM that > "going through the histories" is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p > views. > > > It splits the 1-p views, as in the 3-1 views, the 1-views themselves never > split. > I meant something different. The 3p view of a history is a matter of the relations that obtain "eternally" between its elements. The 1p view however is a matter of the relations that obtain "momentarily" between discrete sensible contexts, if indeed in the end we can make sense of such a conception. I'm pretty sure that this is how Hoyle saw it, because he took pains to pick out the internal self-ordering of mutually-exclusive observer moments as predominating in the spatial-temporal perspective of a universalised "frog" . And there can be no doubt that he was suggesting, in his analogy, that this frog is the unique proxy for all of us and that its perspective is, for each moment, the universal one. > > > > > I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as > self-ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the > entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics. > > > Eventually I use only s, 0, +, *, and classical logic. > > May be you will get the tools to make this enough precise so that I see > what you are talking about. > > This is "my" problem, I have to unravel things in term of numbers > relations. The 8 "hypostases", and their multimodal combinations provides > means to take into account many nuances. > > I am not sure about "observer moment", although for the 1p I guided myself > through possible semantics for the S4Grz logics. > > > > "Eventually" here relies on a similar opacity to delays in continuation as > you argue in the UDA, plus the reliance on prior relativisation to some > specific spatial-temporal orientation, to get a 1p notion of temporal order. > > > We must derive the spatiotemporal order by the sum of the computations > below our substitution level. > > It is a problem for the "classical computationalist" (by which I mean > accepting the classical theory of knowledge, which is mainly that know(p) > -> p. By definition. A more "introspective axiom" would be know(p) -> > know(know(p)). And that are the main part of the modal logic S4, in the > classical or boolean context. > > > > > But perhaps this formulation of a discrete observer moment is incompatible > with comp? > > > I think it is premature to decide if the 1p can have a discrete structure. > I would say that I am agnostic on this, but that the evidences are more > that the arithmetical knowable and feel-able are associated with the > continuum. Both the evidences coming from the "arithmetical", and the > empirical evidence. > It is an open problem. > Well, of course I don't insist on this. I just find the idea to have interesting consequences (which we've hardly touched on). But it may just be misconceived. > > > > > Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an >> indexical internal point of view. >> > > Perhaps it gets it "eventually", in the sense I outline above? > > > Hmm... I think it gets it at the start. The question, sometimes, seems to > me more why did it lost it? > > I think you ask difficult theological question, it might be still very > hard to translate them in arithmetic or in arithmetical, computer-science > theoretical terms. > I suspect so. > > > > >> >> The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just >> non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent >> way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities >> symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and >> every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously. >> >> That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of >> probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent >> continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be >> duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one >> to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher "probability" >> of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each >> continuation is individually certain in a different underlying sense. This >> is just to say that subjective uncertainty (or the expectation of >> probabilistic outcomes) is a function of incomplete knowledge at any given >> point in the sequence. >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous to, or >> possibly even incompatible with, comp >> >> >> I think about it. I try to make sense of it. That might have sense, but >> then it remains to look at it in arithmetic. >> I mean the relations between a person and the universal person "in her" >> is complex, and the splitting between []p and []p & p is part of it. >> >> but personally I still find it a neat heuristic for pumping one's >> intuition on the indeterminacy of first-personal expectations. >> >> >> OK. >> It is just that I expect platonism to be counter-intuitive and so >> intuition pump must be handled with care. But you know that. I just try to >> understand the point. >> > > Absolutely. I appreciate your interest. > > > The problem with comp is that between the "terrestrial" level, of the > effective and creative sigma_1 complete machine or relative numbers, and > Arithmetical truth, there are many intermediates "divine" structure (in a > weak sense of divine, with divine = non Turing emulable, but possibly > sense-full, arithmetical relations. > > With comp, the math is there, but that might not be a so nice news for a > philosopher, especially if he get through some math teaching trauma. > > I am against death penalty, but I am willing to make exception for the > mathematicians which disgusts kids from mathematics for sadistic purpose. > Yeah, my high school maths teacher used to throw wooden blackboard erasers at the heads of his students. Perhaps he thought that would give his instruction more impact. Fortunately it was apparent to me even then that he was just a foul-tempered old time-server rather than the embodiment of the spirit of his subject. Nevertheless he wasn't able to stimulate much appreciation for mathematical enquiry, which revived independently only somewhat later in life. David > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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