On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:04, chris peck wrote:
Hi Liz
>> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be
sent to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send
you to A or B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin
flip". But by accident it duplicates you, and sends you to both.
This effectively conflates the comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you
can't easily disentangle them in this thought experiment.
An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a
determined result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to
uncertainty from 1p.
OK.
Thats the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision.
You get 1p uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty.
That's the interest. And it is what you say above, so I don't follow
you here.
By introducing a 'quantum coin flip' you're loading the dice towards
uncertainty.
Well, not with Everett MWI. You get 3p certainty (the Shroedinger wave
evolves deterministically) and from it Everett explains the 1p
uncertainty, in a manner similar to the comp FPI.
So I can't really say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.
The "equivalence" comes from the fact that Everett explains the
quantum indeterminacy by a form of first person (that he called
subjective") mechanist indeterminacy interpreting superposition as
actual relative multiplication/duplication, or differentiation.
This restores all what Einstein likes in physics: 3p determinacy and
3p locality.
Then my point is that if we take that move seriously, without
reification of neither mind nor matter, we have to push that move on a
part of the arithmetical reality /truth.
Then I have done this, and we get indeed an intuitionist logic/
mathematics for the mind, and a quantum logic/mathematics for matter.
To be short.
I explain a bit of modal logic with the goal of showing how that
happens, and has to happen, in case computationalism is true.
>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one
outcome.
Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there
is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering
what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability
he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on
what identity criterion gets imposed.
It depends only on the difference between 1p and 3p, and the identity-
theory based on personal memory and of course personality feature,
which is the one defined by the acceptance of the artificial digital
brain.
All the rest follows, and indeed, we could use simple proving machine,
with quite elementary induction and inductive inference ability, to
formalize this easily. This is done eventually in the translation of
UDA in arithmetic, which I am currently explaining.
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with
again.
The uncertainty is invariant for all the identity theories as far as
they are consistent with the idea of surviving with a digital body or
brain, or "generalized brain".
But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just
recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome,
... one outcome that they were unable to predict. Only those having
written "W v M" win, all the others prediction failed.
You don't need to know who you are, in the 1p sense, to be able to
open a door and distinguish Washington from Moscow, and write the
result in a diary.
I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability
assignments would be asymmetric
I can be OK. If W and M represents the place where my 3p body will be
reconstituted, then with the step 3 protocol, we already know that
P("W & M") = 1.
Now we are polite and attribute two different, and incompatible, 1p
experience to each of the copies, so if W and M represent place where
I will survive, then again P('"W & M") = 1. That is the 3-1 view : the
experiencer will be conscious in Washington and he will be conscious
in Moscow.
All this is already known from comp. And in step 3, we ask a different
question, which is what do you expect to live from the 1p view (which
is equal to the 1-1-1-1-1-... view) when pushing on the button.
So, if W and M represent the result of the outcome of "pushing the
button, opening the door, and writing in the diary the outcome, then
we already know, assuming comp of course, that in no situation can the
guy open the door and see both cities at once, so that P("W & M") = 0.
Similarly, P("W") ≠ 1, P("M") ≠ 1, and P("W v M") = 1.
from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he
doesn't manage that.
What is wrong with above?
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
> From: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
> Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above
pap" =
> the FPI of step 3):
>
> > The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only
> > reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
>
>
> OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
>
> The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC
> indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic
> framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to
> Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of
> computationalism.
>
> That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and
is
> basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my
> papers, 'course.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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