On 26 Feb 2014, at 07:21, chris peck wrote:
Hi Bruno
>> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.
There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.
Read the posts by John Clark. I made clear that the first person
expectation are what is confimred or not in the pesronal diaries of
the copies, that is the 1-views, and it systematically describes only
the 3-1- views, which is nice and correct, but not asked for.
>>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should
expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite".
But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong!
?
I am in H, I predict "I will see something definite, meaning W or M,
but not a fuzzy superpostion of both".
I push on the button.
I open the door, I see Washington. Well defined old Washington. I can
only write "W" in my diary, and assess my prediction "I will see
something definite, meaning W or M, but not a fuzzy superposition of
both"."
The same for the "I" opening the door and seeing the well defined old
Moscow. he too sees something definite, and assess the prediction.
By definition of the 1p, it is on that personal confirmation or
refutation that bears the indeterminacy.
>> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome".
You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to
be seen.
But I can only use what is seen, to refute or assess the prediction,
that is what can be expected to be see. The 1/3 distinctions makes it
possible to handled in 3p description only (making a logical
derivation of the argument looking like a play with word).
I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect
to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either
future self sees both.
Of course, but this is the 3-1 view, and we have agreed on that. In
that case, she can also consider that from both it will looks like
they got freely one bit of information, and that is the FPI.
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert
attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it?
The contrary. It is needed to avoid the ambiguities. And the 1p/3p
relations is really an important part of the computionalist, or not,
mind-body problem, so your remark seems awkward.
In AUDA, the translation in arithmetic, the 3p and 1p will correspond
to different arithmetical modal logic related to self-reference.
"The rubbishy smoke screen", is the very subject matter. I submit a
problem, and partial solutions, testable, and up to now tested (thanks
to both Gödel and QM).
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and
spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where,
in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's
step 3, he argues:
"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."
That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.
Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should
have said:
"whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious
she will never see both outcome".
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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