Hi Bruno >> Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only >> extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.
Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying substrata of reality consists of, be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. What causes the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and subjective uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure. In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate himself in a particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch where infinite numbers of universes run in parallel one might not know whether one is in a spin up or spin down universe. Or in your step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after duplication but before opening the door. These people are unable to locate and that lack of knowledge translates into subjective uncertainty. They can assign a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible outcomes. But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values available must be 1 or 0. That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered for. And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts. So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5 to M or W, prior to duplication H guy would assign 1. This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling probabilities in from the future which strikes me as very fishy. >> OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body problem. >> Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But they get the >> closer view of the physical possible with respect to both comp, and the >> mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus). Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent theory. My guess is that they don't, I mean who does? It seems like everyone but me thinks they are in direct contact with the one and only truth, but its all just hubris. It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs on the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do far better when it comes to probability assignment and subjective uncertainty, imho. All the best Chris From: [email protected] Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: [email protected] 2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck <[email protected]>: Hi Liz >> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume >> there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your >> physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe. We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will always see 'spin up'. MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in which 'we' appear. That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure, where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO All the best Chris. From: [email protected] Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: [email protected] 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck <[email protected]>: Hi Bruno >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect >>(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...) Quentin All the best Chris. From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: "What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down." That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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