Bless your noddly appendages.
On 25 February 2014 06:57, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated > with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state > of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is > correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual > pastas are or exactly how they taste like. > > However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one > thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete > because it always continues to output the current observable information > state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to > falsifiability). > > My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect > while yours does not. > > Quentin > > > > 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]>: > >> Bruno, >> >> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes >> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what >> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. >> >> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical >> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is >> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable >> universe. >> >> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the >> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by >> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations >> are or exactly how they work. >> >> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For >> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and >> logically complete because it always continues to output the current >> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. >> >> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this >> respect while yours does not. >> >> Edgar >> >> >> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>> >>> Craig, >>> >>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some >>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it >>> from my computational reality. >>> >>> >>> >>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does >>> your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any >>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers? >>> >>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any >>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical >>> implementation of a computation. >>> >>> >>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and >>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that >>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale >>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems >>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp"). >>> >>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> :-) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Craig, >>>>> >>>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Computational Theory of Mind. >>>> >>>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. >>>> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when >>>> I suspect that is neither. >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Edgar >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>>>>> >>>>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >>>>>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >>>>>> encountered. >>>>>> >>>>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>>>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is >>>>>> counted >>>>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, >>>>>> and >>>>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>>>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>>>>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>>>>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>>>>> >>>>>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >>>>>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >>>>>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >>>>>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware >>>>>> substrate, >>>>>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself >>>>>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>>>>> >>>>>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism >>>>>> behind computation, I conclude that: >>>>>> >>>>>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>>>>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>>>>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>>>>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>>>>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>>>>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >>>>>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>>>>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>>>>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >>>>>> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >>>>>> directly. >>>>>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a >>>>>> trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters >>>>>> is >>>>>> the sole axiom. >>>>>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can >>>>>> be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the >>>>>> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>>>>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>>>>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP >>>>>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>>>>> theoretical platform of sense. >>>>>> >>>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
