2014-02-24 20:24 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>: > > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>: >> >> >>> >>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why >>>>> the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me >>>>> here >>>>> has been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way >>>>> that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world >>>>> was right?" >>>> >>>> >>>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world >>>> turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to >>>> agree that you were wrong and the world was right?" >>>> >>> >>> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world >>> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that >>> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. >>> >>> >>>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in >>>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant >>>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective >>>> consequences for the patient. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be >>> functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal >>> experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the >>> transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be >>> impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to >>> us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring >>> to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. >>> >>> >>>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is >>>> that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, >>>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution >>>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, >>>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? >>>> >>> >>> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake >>> pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that >>> mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? >>> Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a >>> Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you >>> can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a >>> bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. >>> >>> >> So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a >> functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will >> be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is >> changed... that's what you mean ? >> >> So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process >> and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would >> that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? >> > > If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct > tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct > tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce? >
Yes, if I "can't tell them apart" then by definition I "can't tell them apart"... You still didn't answer the question... > > Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which > can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of > bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself > which conjures something to be contained. > > Craig > > >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
