On 24 February 2014 19:02, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the >>> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has >>> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that >>> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was >>> right?" >> >> >> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned >> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree >> that you were wrong and the world was right?" >> > > It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world > already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that > transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. > > >> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in >> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant >> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective >> consequences for the patient. >> > > Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally > substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of > the patient, > OK, we're getting somewhere. Doesn't that imply that the function is providing an adequate substitute for the "original" subjective components it is emulating? > but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal > experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. > Oops, I spoke too soon. Transpersonal and subpersonal experiences? You seem to be saying something like "Let's be very careful about any such substitution because although it may seem to make no ordinary sort of personal difference to you or anyone else, to any arbitrary level of detail, there may still be other non-ordinary types of personal differences and the consequence of that will be ..." well, what? The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it > makes absolutely no difference > ... To your tenacious grip on your theory? > and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be > generated mechanically. > How is it a Red Herring? You just conceded that an appropriate level of functional substitution would make no difference to the subjective state of the patient. > >> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is >> that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, >> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution >> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, >> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? >> > > Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal > on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, > does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and > duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls > stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? > Hm..so if I had a piece of my brain substituted that made no subjective or objective difference you might concede that I was still the original David Nyman, just slightly foxed. However at what point would you say that too much of me had been replaced and I was no longer acceptable as the original, no matter how much I protested to the contrary? How much would be too much? > If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you > start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being > devalued significantly. > If your brain is constantly replaced atom by atom and molecule by molecule, as indeed we are told it is, is it thereby any less your brain? Ah, but your theory has it that this is merely the tip of an iceberg and what is really occurring is an integral part of a never-ending story told in entirely other terms. You know what? Every other theory has it that way too, when you come to think of it. Stuff happens for deep and possibly unfathomable reasons and it ain't about to tell us everything about itself. But despite this, we appear to be able to understand and intervene rather effectively in the exterior form of such happenings and we try to explain this ability, and its consequences, with the fewest possibly extraneous assumptions. And as far as I can see the idea that any fundamental distinction between copy and original is germane to any such explanation is extraneous to the nth degree. Indeed the most effective explanations we have developed to date appear to contradict it directly both in principle and in practice. For good measure, I am still unable to fathom what necessary connection it has with the problems of consciousness. But I guess I'm probably just missing the point as usual. 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