On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:11:47 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-24 20:24 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]<javascript:> > >: > >> >> >> On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why >>>>>> the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me >>>>>> here >>>>>> has been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the >>>>>> way >>>>>> that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the >>>>>> world >>>>>> was right?" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world >>>>> turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have >>>>> to >>>>> agree that you were wrong and the world was right?" >>>>> >>>> >>>> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world >>>> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that >>>> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. >>>> >>>> >>>>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in >>>>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any >>>>> significant >>>>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective >>>>> consequences for the patient. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be >>>> functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal >>>> experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the >>>> transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be >>>> impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' >>>> to >>>> us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring >>>> to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. >>>> >>>> >>>>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. >>>>> Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, >>>>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution >>>>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, >>>>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake >>>> pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that >>>> mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? >>>> Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being >>>> a >>>> Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, >>>> you >>>> can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a >>>> bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. >>>> >>>> >>> So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a >>> functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will >>> be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is >>> changed... that's what you mean ? >>> >>> So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process >>> and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would >>> that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? >>> >> >> If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct >> tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct >> tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce? >> > > Yes, if I "can't tell them apart" then by definition I "can't tell them > apart"... > > You still didn't answer the question... >
The answer is that one person not being able to tell them apart at some particular moment doesn't mean anything. I don't know how much clearer I can make it: <http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/simberg.jpg?w=595> > >> Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which >> can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of >> bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself >> which conjures something to be contained. >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> David >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
