Thanks Bruno... As an advocate of a computational reality, I certainly believe that part of that universe (subsets) is computational minds, though I suspect we'd disagree about most of the rest....
Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:53:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote: > > > Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? > > > > It is Computationalist Theory of Mind. It is another name of > computationalism or comp, although usually comp refers explicitly to the > very weak (logically) version of it. > Usually CTM assumes that the brain is the "organ of consciousness' and > that neurons are the main items handling information, but comp assumes only > a level of digital substitution, which can be as low as we want, and works > for a general notion of brains, which can any portion of the physical > universe we would have to copy to have the consciousness invariance. Comp > can have a level so low that we might need the copy of the whole universe, > at the level of strings described with 10^(10^10) decimals, for example > (and that is usually not allowed implicitly in common forms of CTM). > So, if you want COMP -> CTM. > I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion > between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or > perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most > cognitive scientists. > > Bruno > > > > > Edgar > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >> >> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >> encountered. >> >> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted >> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >> >> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and >> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >> >> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, >> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself >> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >> >> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind >> computation, I conclude that: >> >> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry >> to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >> directly. >> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical >> explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. >> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be >> redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the >> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather >> than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a >> perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >> theoretical platform of sense. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
