On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:34:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 02 Mar 2014, at 13:36, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that it > > is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it stop > > being about motivation and becomes that we can't think straight? ass > > > > Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks > > to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on > > (strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab over > > days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't return > > to normal until all the REM is made up for) > > i > > Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue > > to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging > > ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc > > kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such > > that 'a change is as good as a rest'. > > ion > > If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious > > in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the > > heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs > > where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with > > our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I > > experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what > > object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable? > > If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him? > > > > If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness > > experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically > > conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which > > hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of > > software, such that the experience is able to think the next > > thought? The processor? RAM? > > > > Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running, > > and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware > > can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it > > be updated to include predictions for what an emergent consciousness > > would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If computation is > > intrinsically consciousness why can we account for the footprint of > > our code, purely in terms of, and exactly > > of that code? > > , > > Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over the > > past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at all > > having been done in this area, for all we know when the computer > > runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a darling little > > consciousness flashing into existence and struggling to survive, > > only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton performance tuner? Why > > is even a chance of that acceptable...why hasn't any work been done > > on the footprint issue? > > > A remarkable set of interesting questions ghibbsa. > > And then, UDA makes things worse, as it adds to the task of explaining > consciousness, when assuming its digital invariance, the derivation of > the beliefs in the physical laws, in arithmetic. > > I submit a problem. Then the translation of that problem in arithmetic > suggest the following answer. > > Computation is not intrinsically consciousness. Consciousness is not > an attribute of computation. Consciousness is an attribute of a > person, a first person notion. > Would you agree you've said many times that it is? Consciousness intrinsic of computation? Leaving that to one side, what is the sequence then in your logic that comp carries no attribute of consciousness, yet as you define comp for your input assumption, from within itself it produces trina replacement device seamlessly continuing a conscious existence? As your starting point - which is now in the frame for a flaw, because the attribute of consciousness must be attached to comp in a step coming before.
> > Comp leads to an hard theory, arithmetic. Intensional arithmetic, as > elementary arithmetic is Turing universal, and any universal system > will do. It is computer science: what can a machine prove, know, > observe, and feel about itself. > > What happens is that any honest universal machine searching the truth > is confronted at the start with "conflicting ways" to "experience" it. > You get them from arithmetic by defining them by using the Theaetetus > definition of knowledge (true justified belief), and its weakening > (consistent, consistent and true) variant. > > Consciousness, like truth, remains undefinable by the correct machine, > but can be approximated by level of self-knowledge and ignorance > awareness. > > More on this in my explanation to Liz. The interest in comp is not in > its (plausible or not) truth, but it is in the fact that it makes > possible to translate the problem in arithmetic. > Well, this is equivalent to a directed reverse selection of comp, and I'm pretty sure a requirement of 'due diligence' to initializing this way, requiring explicit satisfaction inside of theoretical bounds. I'm not sure this even needs referencing since it is pretty straight forward in the opposite direction, that the sequencing of comps definition, construction and selection are legitimate objects of scrutiny things initialized this way,. Hard science indeed. Risk of head explosion. With p arithmetic and sigma_1 (and free or true) p truth []p beliefs []p & p knowledge []p & <>p observations []p & <>p & p sensations provides 8 "person pov" that you can attribute to the universal number defining the "[]". 8, because three of them splits into effective and non effective part "yet true". (So that theory explains something about consciousness by relating a correct "obvious" part to non justifiable truth) (It makes also consciousness into a fixed point of the doubt, like in Descartes). You must study a bit of computer science and mathematical logic, and philosophical logic, to see that with Gödel's discovery, we have discovered a person, and infinitely of them, in arithmetic. \ No theories are required to expose their reasoning directly I think. Minimum qualifications for reading the reasoning would have to be demonstrated as a failure in following reasoning. You ask question, but are you ready to listen to an answer? In this case the answer is that truth is in your head, but if you are lazy you can program a universal machine to look for you. But then again, the question will be "will you listen to the machine?". You need to listen to their silence, also, sometimes justified, sometimes not. I did ask several questions and I am ready to hear answers to one or more questions in line with your able-ness or willingness to have a go at provisioning those answers. You have gone the way of one fell sweep answering all of them, negatively by disconnecting consciousness from comp. The logic of this situation is that at whatever earlier or parallel stage or process you correct this disconnection - which logically for your theory and the definition of comp you use, you will have to do. Where ever and whenever this recoupling takes place, those questions I asked, will need answering or falsifying, most of them anyway, for I assembled them in the first especially that they stand up as loops and hurdles any construction of comp must jump and dive through, as such part of an improved more robust solution, or part of a major problem for your theory and you. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
