On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:34:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Mar 2014, at 13:36, [email protected] wrote:
> So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that
it
> is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it stop
> being about motivation and becomes that we can't think straight?
ass
>
> Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks
> to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on
> (strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab
over
> days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't return
> to normal until all the REM is made up for)
> i
> Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue
> to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging
> ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc
> kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such
> that 'a change is as good as a rest'.
> ion
> If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious
> in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the
> heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs
> where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with
> our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I
> experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what
> object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable?
> If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him?
>
> If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness
> experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically
> conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which
> hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of
> software, such that the experience is able to think the next
> thought? The processor? RAM?
>
> Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running,
> and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware
> can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it
> be updated to include predictions for what an emergent
consciousness
> would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If computation is
> intrinsically consciousness why can we account for the footprint of
> our code, purely in terms of, and exactly
> of that code?
> ,
> Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over
the
> past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at all
> having been done in this area, for all we know when the computer
> runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a darling little
> consciousness flashing into existence and struggling to survive,
> only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton performance tuner? Why
> is even a chance of that acceptable...why hasn't any work been done
> on the footprint issue?
A remarkable set of interesting questions ghibbsa.
And then, UDA makes things worse, as it adds to the task of
explaining
consciousness, when assuming its digital invariance, the derivation
of
the beliefs in the physical laws, in arithmetic.
I submit a problem. Then the translation of that problem in
arithmetic
suggest the following answer.
Computation is not intrinsically consciousness. Consciousness is not
an attribute of computation. Consciousness is an attribute of a
person, a first person notion.
Would you agree you've said many times that it is? Consciousness
intrinsic of computation?
