On Monday, March 3, 2014 6:53:16 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 02 Mar 2014, at 19:53, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:34:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 02 Mar 2014, at 13:36, [email protected] wrote: >> >> > So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that it >> > is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it stop >> > being about motivation and becomes that we can't think straight? ass >> > >> > Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks >> > to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on >> > (strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab over >> > days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't return >> > to normal until all the REM is made up for) >> > i >> > Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue >> > to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging >> > ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc >> > kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such >> > that 'a change is as good as a rest'. >> > ion >> > If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious >> > in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the >> > heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs >> > where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with >> > our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I >> > experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what >> > object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable? >> > If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him? >> > >> > If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness >> > experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically >> > conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which >> > hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of >> > software, such that the experience is able to think the next >> > thought? The processor? RAM? >> > >> > Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running, >> > and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware >> > can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it >> > be updated to include predictions for what an emergent consciousness >> > would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If computation is >> > intrinsically consciousness why can we account for the footprint of >> > our code, purely in terms of, and exactly >> > of that code? >> > , >> > Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over the >> > past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at all >> > having been done in this area, for all we know when the computer >> > runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a darling little >> > consciousness flashing into existence and struggling to survive, >> > only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton performance tuner? Why >> > is even a chance of that acceptable...why hasn't any work been done >> > on the footprint issue? >> >> >> A remarkable set of interesting questions ghibbsa. >> >> And then, UDA makes things worse, as it adds to the task of explaining >> consciousness, when assuming its digital invariance, the derivation of >> the beliefs in the physical laws, in arithmetic. >> >> I submit a problem. Then the translation of that problem in arithmetic >> suggest the following answer. >> >> Computation is not intrinsically consciousness. Consciousness is not >> an attribute of computation. Consciousness is an attribute of a >> person, a first person notion. >> > > Would you agree you've said many times that it is? Consciousness > intrinsic of computation? > > > You will not find one quote. On the contrary I insist on the contrary. > Consciousness is an attribute of person, and they exist in Platonia, out of > time and space and physics, which arises from their views from inside. > It is very simple: you cannot equate a first person notion, like > consciousness, and *any* third person notions. With comp, we almost equate > it when saying yes to the doctor, but we don't it "affirmatively", we do it > because we *hope* we get a level right, but the theory will explain that we > are "invoking God" implicitly in the process, and that is why I insist it > is a theology. > Fair enough Bruno - I got that wrong then. I was very sure, but I'm too lazy to go look, since intuitively I do totally trust your word. However, like me you may be a bit mad, in which case, if I do see a quote I'll be sure to come get you!
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