On 3/6/2014 11:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Mar 2014, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/6/2014 7:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
(b) think computation is intrinsically conscious

But this wording is worst, as it looks like it insists that a computation (or some computation) are conscious. But only a first person is conscious, and a first person is nothing capable of being defined in any 3p way.

For example, a brain cannot think. Brain activity cannot think, a computer cannot think, a computation cannot think, I would say. But I can still say yes to the doctor, because I can believe that my consciousness is related to an infinity of number relation in arithmetic, and that a brain or a machine might make it possible for that consciousness to be manifestable here and now, with hopefully the right relative measure.

If it were not manifested here and now, what would it be conscious of?

Well, either in some other "here and now", as this is an indexical, or of something else (in some altered state of consciousness which might have nothing to do with "here and now"), or it might just not be conscious at all.

What I am saying here is just that 3p things can only be conscious in some metaphorical way, like when we say that a machine can think, which really means only that a machine can support a thinking/conscious first person agent.

And without support...no consciousness.


The conscious-thinker has to be a first person, not a body. The first lesson of computationalism is that "I" am not "my body", I own or borrow it only. In principle, I can get another one.

Not a body I can understand (although I think a body and even an environment may be necessary). But you also say "not a computation".

Brent

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