On 06 Mar 2014, at 09:51, [email protected] wrote:
On Thursday, March 6, 2014 8:31:29 AM UTC, [email protected] wrote: On Thursday, March 6, 2014 8:06:19 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 22:15, [email protected] wrote:On Monday, March 3, 2014 6:53:16 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Mar 2014, at 19:53, [email protected] wrote:On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:34:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Mar 2014, at 13:36, [email protected] wrote:> So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that it > is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it stop > being about motivation and becomes that we can't think straight? ass> > Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks > to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on> (strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab over > days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't return> to normal until all the REM is made up for) > i > Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue > to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging > ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc> kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such> that 'a change is as good as a rest'. > ion > If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious > in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the> heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs > where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with> our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I > experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what> object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable?> If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him? > > If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness > experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically > conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which > hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of > software, such that the experience is able to think the next > thought? The processor? RAM? >> Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running, > and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware> can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it> be updated to include predictions for what an emergent consciousness> would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If computation is> intrinsically consciousness why can we account for the footprint of> our code, purely in terms of, and exactly > of that code? > ,> Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over the> past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at all > having been done in this area, for all we know when the computer> runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a darling little> consciousness flashing into existence and struggling to survive,> only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton performance tuner? Why > is even a chance of that acceptable...why hasn't any work been done> on the footprint issue? A remarkable set of interesting questions ghibbsa.And then, UDA makes things worse, as it adds to the task of explaining consciousness, when assuming its digital invariance, the derivation ofthe beliefs in the physical laws, in arithmetic.I submit a problem. Then the translation of that problem in arithmeticsuggest the following answer. Computation is not intrinsically consciousness. Consciousness is not an attribute of computation. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, a first person notion.Would you agree you've said many times that it is? Consciousness intrinsic of computation?You will not find one quote. On the contrary I insist on the contrary. Consciousness is an attribute of person, and they exist in Platonia, out of time and space and physics, which arises from their views from inside. It is very simple: you cannot equate a first person notion, like consciousness, and *any* third person notions. With comp, we almost equate it when saying yes to the doctor, but we don't it "affirmatively", we do it because we *hope* we get a level right, but the theory will explain that we are "invoking God" implicitly in the process, and that is why I insist it is a theology.Fair enough Bruno - I got that wrong then.OK.I was very sure, but I'm too lazy to go look, since intuitively I do totally trust your word. However, like me you may be a bit mad, in which case, if I do see a quote I'll be sure to come get you!Well, that might not been enough. I might have indeed use expression like "a machine can think" or even "computation can be conscious" in some context, as a shortening for "a machine can support consciousness", or "a computation can make possible for a conscious person to manifest itself relatively to some environment".The basic rule is simple: we cannot identify any 1p thing with any 3p thing. The nice happening in AUDA, is that we can understand from the math that impossibility in a complete 3p view. That is: we can explain in the usual 3p scientific mode why there is an 1p, different from the 3p body, and different from any 3p notion, without needing to commit ourself to an ontological dualism. The dualism involved is purely epistemological, but shown unavoidable for any self-referentially correct machines or relative numbers.Note that Kripke himself, using modal logic, already provided an argument against the brain-mind identity thesis, notably in his book "Naming and Necessity".BrunoFair enough....but can I just say my most recent memory, which is very partial and devoid of context...just a few shards of shattered glass really. The only point of it, would be if it jogged your memory saying it, which allowed you to explain. There's a strong possibility my memory was someone else not you so not to worry if you're sure you didn't say it.So my memory shard for context is that....things turned to what I thought was the matter of computation and whether it was intrinsically conscious.I don't remember how the too and fro happened, but at some stage, another memory shard is that, I interpreted, you responded affirmatively to computation intrinsically consciousness question (asked by me or someone)my memory shard for what you said is something like - and this is likely paraphrase "they seem different"...."little pieces of computation..." ....."but in a real way...."...."...they are like us....",..."conscious".So as I remembered it, all together something like "computation is intrinsically conscious or proto-conscious, computation is like us but maybe more primitive or primordial, but nevertheless directly related, and in some sense that is significant and meaningful they are conscious...even if it's nothing so sophisticated as our own,...a definite relation though"That's my most recent memory Bruno. Maybe it wasn't you. Maybe I misinterpreted at the time. Maybe I misremembered. But that's a memory....which stayed with me....because basically it was something I felt profoundly at odds with, but had no expression at the time, or means, to challenge, or felt not.If that jogs anything, positively....maybe I'll bother doing some google groups searches. not sure how that service runs. Hopefully it's better than yahoo's effort tee hee. bound to be.Bruno - scrap the above.
OK.
I wasn't thinking clearly. I don't know why I'm bothering you or me with a 'shard' memory. You're explaining the sense you would mean it to me above. Therefore it doesn't matter what wording was used in the past, beyond the sort of input a high school English teacher would have into this :O)Instead of the above, can I request some context, in terms of what other people that are your peers, think as to this. For example, the guy that said something like "consciousness is what code feels like to be processed".Would you say that statement implies a belief computation is trinsically conscious?
"consciousness is what code feels like to be processed" might, or not, convey the right thing. It is hard to say without some context.
Usually I prefer to avoid such sentences, as they can be misleading. It might gives the feeling that "consciousness" is attributed to some 3p activity of some programs, when it can only be attributed to an abstract first person which might consciousness is made manifestable relatively to you through that processing.
Then later, we can express this shortly by an expression like ""consciousness is what code feels like to be processed", as a sort of metaphor.
If fact I might ask you what do you mean by "consciousness is what code feels like to be processed", and actually I might ask you if you agree that
"yes doctor" implies "consciousness is what code feels like to be processed"
and/or"consciousness is what code feels like to be processed" implies "yes doctor",
where "yes doctor" is the comp act of faith, or bet, done by the person who accept an artificial digital brain.
?
What about others - like Russell (who might just read this and be willing to answer ). Does Russell(a) agree with you completely
Only Russell can answer this. I would use "understand" instead of "agree", because I don't think it i a question of agreeing. It is question of acknowledging the validity of a reasoning, or of showing something missing or some flaws, or some unclarity. from our conversation, I would say that Russell "agrees" with the FPI, and probably UDA1-7, but as some reservation on the step 8. Here I do agree that I am not always as clear as I would like, due to the fact that step 8, as to refer to a "reality" and use some occam razor. But his critics relies also on a controversial idea about counterfactuals (defended notably by Deutch, or even Lewis) that once we accept the many-worlds, we handle the counterfactuals, but this does not really work. In fact the handling of counterfactuals in analytical philosophy can lead directly to a modal quantum logic. Yet, the "many-worlds" associated naturally with that quantum modal logic has few, if any, relationship with the "world" in Everett sense. Then, due to this, I prefer to avoid the counterfactuals altogether (like in the Movie Graph Argument (MGA), but unlike Maudlin similar (but non equivalent) reasoning leading to the same conclusion as step 8 (mainly that the brain identity thesis is false). Recently, I rediscovered that Kripke has also a general argument, based here explicitly on modal logic, to refute the identity thesis. I have to rethink about this. Russell also promised to send a post on step 8/MGA.
Of course Russell can add something here.
(b) think computation is intrinsically conscious
But this wording is worst, as it looks like it insists that a computation (or some computation) are conscious. But only a first person is conscious, and a first person is nothing capable of being defined in any 3p way.
For example, a brain cannot think. Brain activity cannot think, a computer cannot think, a computation cannot think, I would say. But I can still say yes to the doctor, because I can believe that my consciousness is related to an infinity of number relation in arithmetic, and that a brain or a machine might make it possible for that consciousness to be manifestable here and now, with hopefully the right relative measure.
(c) think it isn't (d) think it's unsettled (e) some version of that set, with words like 'probably' added.
Keep in mind also that if comp is true, it is close to being unbelievable.
Keep also in mind that I do not defend at all the truth of comp. I genuinely doubt it very much. people can sometimes believe that I defend the truth of comp, because I show that their refutation of comp is not valid. But this does not entail, of course, that comp is true, or that I believe in comp. All I show is that IF comp is true, then physics is not the fundamental science, as it must be reduced to arithmetic, in the same sense that for a materialist biology must be reduced (and arguably has been reduced) to physics.
Does Church thesis say anything either way?
Not really, because Church thesis identify two 3p things. The set of intuitively computable functions, and the set of functions computable in Lambda calculus.
That is, the version of comp you use for a starter? What about other versions, whether alternative or primordial/earlier/original or whatever
They might influence on the choice of the substitution level, but the version of comp does not put any boundaries on that level, and so is entailed by those other versions. And thus, everything obtained as consequence of the weak version of computationalism that I study, will automatically applied in those stronger version of comp. That is why the reasoning is very general.
Only if you find a version of comp, for which you must say "no" to the doctor, however low the level is, then such a version of comp would prevent the UDA's conclusion to be applicable. To help the understanding of this, I provoke (perhaps) by saying that we have to backtrack 1500 years in the field of theology, when Plato's theology was still taught in Plato Academy in Athena, before this was made illegal by the romans, and it is not yet well seen today.
All much appreciated. I think I understand the Turing/universal/ machine definitions....even if can't express them correctly. I've a good visual on that, I think.
OK. Do you see that we can prove the existence of (universal) Turing machine in arithmetic? Do you see well that the notion of Turing machine is purely mathematical, and can be defined in term of sets, or even numbers? That helps a lot for the sequel.
Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
