On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?

If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,
True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming?

I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each "branching" only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience?

Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism.

At each "branching" only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.

If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful thinking.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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