On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at
all? Or
is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
*Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?
*
If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,
True; but I don't assume that.
Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you
haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you /are/
assuming?
I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something
different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each
"branching" only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience?
Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for
most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism.
At each "branching" only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord
well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain
why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in
QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.
But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only
experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal
terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this
answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, "QM is a
probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect?"
My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with
lots of very accurate predictions, but "comp" as a new speculative theory kind of gets a
free ride on the very same questions, e.g. why do we not experience superpositions? Why
isn't there a superposition of the M-guy and the W-guy according to comp. How can
consciousness be instantiated by physical processes? Most people on this list just assume
it can't and dismiss the very idea as mere physicalism. But they don't ask how can
consciousness be instantiated by infinite threads of computation - that's mysterious and
consciousness is mysterious, so it's OK.
If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your
favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more
truth research, but wishful thinking.
But you know that is not what is done. QM predicts probability distributions that are
confirmed to many decimal places. QFT predicts some measured values to 11 decimal
places. And you rely on QM to explain the world in in you theory of comp. Your approach
is to explain QM and then let QM do the rest of the work - which is fine. But my point is
that QM can still do the work even if it's a probabilistic theory. So unless comp can
make some better predictions than comp it's just an interpretation and it's trading off a
distaste for randomness (a very restricted and well defined randomness) for a love of
everythingism. Which is why I hope comp can predict something about consciousness; where
it may offer something beyond just interpretation.
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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