On 26 Mar 2014, at 02:23, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some
draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version,
making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under
influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I
am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like
"pretending that I "believe" in "parallel world", that's enough).
Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the
FPI result?
That was unclear.
If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who
conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving
subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory.
OK. But although we can argue some implicit use of comp by Everett, he
uses only quantum superposition, and failed to realize that classical
mechanics entails it already. This explains also why he missed that we
might need to consider the indeterminacy on all computations (quantum
or not), and eventually that the FPI bears on arithmetic. Everett was
a bit loose on this aspect. As far as I remember the allusion to
mechanism is slightly more explicit in Wheeler assessment of Everett.
That was the
implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it
either way, historically.
That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the
computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly
computationalist.
Of course, I would say he is, at least implicitly, but the key point
is that he remains physicalist and assumes the "FPI" is defined only
on the universal wave, that he assumes, not seeing that once you make
the comp move, the measure problem (roughly solved by Gleason theorem
in the quantum context), is no more solved and has to be handled
again, in a way capable of justifying the quantum wave.
But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space
is fundamental, so only needs Everett.
And some non-comp fuzzy axiom, because with comp, even if the quantum
wave was "really existing", it would not explain why we can avoid the
many-computations context. The Hilbert structure *cannot* be assumed,
once we use comp.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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