On 26 March 2014 12:40, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > On 26 March 2014 13:37, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness >>>> flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are >>>> immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication >>>> between its distant parts. >>>> >>>> Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's >>> "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that identical quantum >>> states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all >>> the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation >>> occurs. (Cosmic, man!) >>> >> >> You don't have to assume comp. >> > > I said if you assume comp OR if you assume Frank Tipler's theory of > immortailty. I added comp because that has the same implications, but the > rest of what I said was assuming Tipler-esque continuity of consciousness > through duplication of quantum states. Admittedly I dashed the post off and > may not have made myself very clear :) > > >> If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is >> secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will >> be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have >> a similar consciousness. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no >> consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will >> still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. >> > > Yes, that's what I was trying to get at. Assuming that consciousness > arises somehow from the quantum state of your brain, and assuming that > identical quantum states are sufficiently identical that consciousness > continues when your quantum state is duplicated, regardless of where that > happens (as Frank Tipler assumes when he says you can die and wake up in a > simulated version of yourself at the end of time) - then you effectively > exist in all the (infinite number of) places your brain's quantum state > does. I've heard from my good friend the internet that the number of > possible quantum states a brain can be in is around 10 ^ 10 ^ 70, which > probably makes the nearest exact copy of my brain quite a long way away > (assuming an infinite universe with the same laws of physics throughout, > and similar initial conditions, and ergodicity whatever that is, etc, etc). > But given worlds enough and time, as we are in eternal inflation for > example, I'm virtually guaranteed to be peppered around the place, a > monstrous regiment which you will be pleased to know is ridiculously far > away, well beyond our cosmic horizon for a googolplex years to come. > > However, this assumes these copies are all me, or maybe I should start > using the Royal "we" from now on (if my name hasn't given that away > already). So I am she as she is me as you are me and we are all together, > except for you. To not assume this - to assume these are all different > people who happen to think they are me - is I think the same as assuming > that identical quantum states can nevertheless be distinguished, somehow - > but I believe the observed properties of BECs argues against this? >
What is the difference between the copies being you and only thinking they are you? I'll put it differently. I propose that, since the matter in your synapses turns over every few minutes, you are not really you a few minutes from now, but merely a copy who thinks you are you. Can you prove if this claim is true or false, and even if you can, does it matter? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
