On 26 March 2014 13:37, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness >>> flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are >>> immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication >>> between its distant parts. >>> >>> Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's >> "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that identical quantum >> states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all >> the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation >> occurs. (Cosmic, man!) >> > > You don't have to assume comp. > I said if you assume comp OR if you assume Frank Tipler's theory of immortailty. I added comp because that has the same implications, but the rest of what I said was assuming Tipler-esque continuity of consciousness through duplication of quantum states. Admittedly I dashed the post off and may not have made myself very clear :) > If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is > secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will > be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have > a similar consciousness. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no > consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will > still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. > Yes, that's what I was trying to get at. Assuming that consciousness arises somehow from the quantum state of your brain, and assuming that identical quantum states are sufficiently identical that consciousness continues when your quantum state is duplicated, regardless of where that happens (as Frank Tipler assumes when he says you can die and wake up in a simulated version of yourself at the end of time) - then you effectively exist in all the (infinite number of) places your brain's quantum state does. I've heard from my good friend the internet that the number of possible quantum states a brain can be in is around 10 ^ 10 ^ 70, which probably makes the nearest exact copy of my brain quite a long way away (assuming an infinite universe with the same laws of physics throughout, and similar initial conditions, and ergodicity whatever that is, etc, etc). But given worlds enough and time, as we are in eternal inflation for example, I'm virtually guaranteed to be peppered around the place, a monstrous regiment which you will be pleased to know is ridiculously far away, well beyond our cosmic horizon for a googolplex years to come. However, this assumes these copies are all me, or maybe I should start using the Royal "we" from now on (if my name hasn't given that away already). So I am she as she is me as you are me and we are all together, except for you. To not assume this - to assume these are all different people who happen to think they are me - is I think the same as assuming that identical quantum states can nevertheless be distinguished, somehow - but I believe the observed properties of BECs argues against this? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
