On 4/30/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2014, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/29/2014 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then it survives an
arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon has to be recovered as a
stable pattern emerging from an infinity of computations in arithmetic, and cannot be
related from anything else.
The point is that "what we call the Moon" IS the Moon.
The question is: *what* is the moon, in the fundamental TOE (that we derive from comp,
for example).
If not, you become instrumentalist, and just abandon the idea of searching a fundamental
theory.
Not at all. The Moon is defined ostensively. But that doesn't mean I'm prevented
developing a theory about what it's made of, how it formed, what effects it has, ...
That's why I said you've been a logician to long; you mistake a definition for the thing
itself and when it's defined you suppose nothing more can be said.
Brent
I am not sure of your motivation here. It looks like "don't ask what is the fundamental
nature of the things we talk about"?
My point is that such nature will depend of the fundamental principle we agree on (if
only for the sake of research: agreeing on axioms does not mean knowing they are true of
course (pace Craig).
I am just saying that if comp is true, existence of physical object must be explain by
"machine's theology or self-referential logics".
Sure. But why is that any more interesting than, "If theism is true, existence of
physical objects must be explained by theist theology." ? Note that any noun whatsoever
can be inserted in place of "theism" and it's still a true sentence. That's the beauty,
and the failure, of logic.
Brent
Wheeler was not so far from this.
Bruno
Brent
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