On 04 May 2014, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno, your 'scientific' logic supersedes me. Explaining ontology by
existing and - I suppose - existing by the likes of
'ontology' (etc.) is more than what I buy.
There is no metaphysics here. I am just saying that if you do a
theory, you have to be clear on what we will agree to be primitively
existing, and what we derive from that assumption.
"We might still stumble" on truth, (or you do not?), what we may
believe as "truth" and draw very important consequences upon OTHER
concepts from it as well.
In "my" agnostic vocabulary the 'real' includes lots of 'inconnues'
that may change whatever we THINK is included - as historic
examples show.
Sure. That is why an (ideal) scientist will never pretend he has a
true theory. It is not really is job, even when he tackles
metaphysical or theological question, it will be under the form IF
this THEN that, etc.
I still hold mathematics an exorbitant achievement of the H U M A
N mind so your formula (besides being hard to follow for me) is not
convincing. The facts WE can calculate from Nature do not evidence a
similar calculation how Nature arrived at them.
The point is only that IF we are Turing emulable THEN physics is given
by ... (and I give the equations).
So we can test computationalism and move forward. Unfortunately,
thanks to Gödel and Everett, comp is confirmed up to now.
(See the early (even recent???) explanatory errors in our sciences).
We are nowhere to decipher Nature's analogue(?) ways (if 'analogue'
covers them all, what I would not suggest).
'Analog' is compatible with computationalism, unless you mean that the
brain uses very special infinities. They might exist, and thanks to
the kind of reasoning I suggest we do, we can test this. But until
such confirmation of non-comp (or refutation of comp), I think we
should not make a theory more complex just by wishful thinking. We can
be agnostic on comp, and still understand its consequences, so that we
can test it, and perhaps refute it.
Bruno
John M
On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 03 May 2014, at 16:38, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between
" stable patterns of information, e.g. perception..."
and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as):
"the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or
formulate some problem, and the phenomenological, or
epistemological existence,"????
Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and
Perception.
I would say "ontology" is a word. But ontology is what exist, and
that can be a word in some theory but could be a giraffe or a
dinosaur, or a planet, or a number, in this or that other theory.
The same for "existence", "information" and "perception", those are
words. But I don't see why information, perception and existence
would be word.
(Later, in the math thread, I might denote the number 2 by s(s(0)),
and denote the sequence "s(s(0))" by the number 2^(code of
s)*5^(code of "("; ...., which will give a large number
s(s(s(s(s(s(s(...(0)))...).
This is necessary to distinguish in arithmetic a number and a code
for that number.)
Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/
mentality.
We can work from the cognitive abilities of machines. Those
abilities can be defined in elementary arithmetic, or in any
computer language.
Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to "as we perceive"
something, the
epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental
capabilities.
All right.
None cuts into anything " R E A L " .
You don't know that.
WE CAN NOT.
You cannot know that too.
What we cannot do, is express that we can. But we can't express that
we cannot do it either.
We cannot pretend having stumble on some truth, but we might still
stumble on some truth. Why not?
Bruno
On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:
So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of
information, e.g. perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon,
tidal effects of the Moon,...
I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the
primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate
some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological
existence, which are the appearance that we derive at some higher
"emergent" level.
With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory
(like Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive
from them the emergence of all universal machines, their
interactions and the resulting first person statistics, which
should explains the origin and development (in some mathematical
space) of the law of physics.
I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon
still exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon,
in that case, definitely not exist".
Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the
moon doesn't exist even when we look at it.
Only the relative relations between my computational states and
infinitely many computations exists.
Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "exist".
?
Are you not begging the question?
I would say that comp does not eviscerate the meaning of
"exists". The meaning is provides by the standard semantics of
predicate logic, where "exists" is a quantifier.
But that is quite a different sense of "exist".
It is most basic one, used at the ontic level. May be you *assume*
a notion of primitive physical existence. Then indeed, with comp we
assume only a simple notion of arithmetical existence (on which
most scientists agree) and derive the physical reality from an
epistemological type of existence.
It just means satisfying axioms and inferences from those axioms.
It means more, as we work in a theory which is supposed to be a
theory of everything. It is not pure logic or pure math. It is
theology or TOE.
Depending on the axioms and the rules of inference you can prove
that something exists or that it cannot exist or that it might
exist but can't be proven.
We work in the comp frame. It presuppose you agree with sentences
like "it exist a number equal to the successor of the successor of
0", etc.
We want explain complex phenomena, from particles interactions to
conscious awareness, from simple basic assumption.
The choosing arithmetic as the base universal theory,
And choosing Christianity as the base universal theory.... And
choosing Marxism as the base universal theory....
I have never met a christian, nor a marxist, believing that
elementary arithmetic is false or useless.
I have met arithmeticians doubting Christianity and/or Marxism.
Elementary arithmetic is a "scientific" theory (even a sub-theory
of most applied scientific theories).
Christianity is a fuzzy and vague corpus of hope and belief,
presupposing too arithmetic.
To oppose or compare Christianity and arithmetic is no better than
opposing Christianity and Evolution Theory.
only number exists, some number functions and relation exists in
a related but slightly different sense, and then physical
existence is precisely define by the "existence" used in the
modal context.
Roughly speaking, we have the intelligible existence the "E" of
arithmetic, then the modal existence:
with [i]p = []p & p, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p, we have
different notion of existence of the type
[i]Ex([i]p(x) and also, (quantized existence)
[i]<i>Ex([i]<i>p(x)). Of course this needs the first order modal
logic extending the current propositional hypostases.
More on this in the math thread.
If my consciousness can survive a physical digital
substitution, then it survives an arithmetical digital
substitution, and what we call the moon has to be recovered as
a stable pattern emerging from an infinity of computations in
arithmetic,
But only, I think, in a different digital universe in which "we"
are also stable patterns of relations.
By the FPI, we are distributed in infinitely many computations
(making the real universe appearance a non digital and unique
(yet multiversal) reality a priori).
And in THAT universe what "we" call "the Moon" is what "we" can
fly too and and on.
OK, then. but I was using the arithmetic TOE(*), and we have to
be clear on all the different notions of existence which emerge
in it.
Bruno
(*) the TOE chosen is Robinson arithmetic. Precisely, it is
predicate logic + the non logical following axioms:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
An observer is a believer in the axioms above + some induction
axioms.
IF you can build a world out of those, THEN an a believer in those
axioms is an observer in THAT world. But that's a long way from
showing it's true of THIS world.
The term "world" is ambiguous. In our case, we derive a many-world
structure from those axioms.
The goal consists in explaining complex things from simple
principle. The physicalist string theory tries to do that too, but,
as I explained, has some issue with the mind-body problem.
I comment your other posts here:
The point is that "what we call the Moon" IS the Moon.
The question is: *what* is the moon, in the fundamental TOE (that
we derive from comp, for example).
If not, you become instrumentalist, and just abandon the idea of
searching a fundamental theory.
Not at all. The Moon is defined ostensively. But that doesn't
mean I'm prevented developing a theory about what it's made of,
how it formed, what effects it has, ... That's why I said you've
been a logician to long; you mistake a definition for the thing
itself and when it's defined you suppose nothing more can be said.
Doing that confusion would mean that I have not been a logician
long enough, as definition theory is part of logic. Such confusion
are the object of study of the logician, which are supposed to be
expert on this.
You don't define the moon ostensively. You provide evidence for a
possible repeatable and sharable experience, but that does not tell
us what the moon is, what ontological and epistemological status it
can have.
I am not sure of your motivation here. It looks like "don't ask
what is the fundamental nature of the things we talk about"?
My point is that such nature will depend of the fundamental
principle we agree on (if only for the sake of research: agreeing
on axioms does not mean knowing they are true of course (pace
Craig).
I am just saying that if comp is true, existence of physical
object must be explain by "machine's theology or self-referential
logics".
Sure. But why is that any more interesting than, "If theism is
true, existence of physical objects must be explained by theist
theology." ?
That correct, but less interesting because man fight on the theist
assumptions, which are hard to make precise. But comp is simpler,
get a lot of evidence, is believed/assumed by most scientist, and
machine's theology is a precise branch of math. Indeed we get
testable consequences, which is not clearly the case for the
current theist theology. The gain is there.
Note that any noun whatsoever can be inserted in place of "theism"
and it's still a true sentence. That's the beauty, and the
failure, of logic.
Not really. Many people believe in comp *and* in primitive physical
object. A priori that seems plausible, but the UDA shows that this
is not plausible. It is not obvious that if comp is true, physics
becomes reduced to intensional number theory. You need to study the
comp mind-body problem to understand the necessity of that
reduction, in that frame.
Logic fails anyway, that is why we need non logical axioms, like
0+x = x, etc.
Last post:
That's why I wrote "what WE call the Moon". The meaning of terms
in language depends on agreed understanding of speaker and
hearer. You can't ostensively define the moon in your dreams to
someone else.
I can, to someone else I am dreaming too.
I have no real problem with your "instrumentalist" definition of
the moon, but it is not enough for solving or progressing in the
mind-body problem, and in the question of the origin.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
