On 13 May 2014, at 14:32, [email protected] wrote:


On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:42:04 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 May 2014, at 20:10, meekerdb wrote:


> How can you test the proposition that computation can instantiate
> consciousness?

By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well,
comp + the classical theory of knowledge).

Bruno

What are the technological/technical steps involved in performing this test?


You really don't get it?

I ask you to assume two hypotheses, sum up into "yes doctor", and the classical Church Turing these.

Then the UDA shows that there is an measure problem, and then I use a bridge between computer science and mathematical logic to translate the problem in arithmetical terms.

Reread the sane2004 paper and tell me what you missed.

I submit a problem.

To you, and to all löbian numbers, actually.

I just explained what the ideally correct machine already says, from different point of views, and show it provides a testable theology.

I have not done the hard work. Cantor, Gödel, Solovay get all this. It is basic theoretical computer science and provability theory.

I submit a question, and I show the beginning of the Löbian machines' answers.

I have gave many times the references, but you have to study some books if you are not familiar with elementary theoretical computer science.

Bruno





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