On 12 May 2014, at 20:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 May 2014, at 21:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2014 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, the rest follows, but the negation of the rest follows too,
unless, like Peter Jones, you add a criterion of primitive
physical existence to what is needed for consciousness. But then
the movie graph can show that they attribute a magical role to
that primitive matter. The idea, for them, is that there is a
primitive matter, and that "the primitive character" is not
Turing emulable.
But if the entangled and holistic character of the world requires
that the Turing emulation extend to essentially all of it then
"primitive matter" just means "exists in the emulation".
Not really. "primitive matter" (the quantum, plausibly) emerges
from the fact that below the substitution level we are confronted
with infinitely many machines. From inside it is not "exists in the
emulation", it is "exists in the relatively more numerous" way.
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating
one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is
"real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
nature.
That's why I think the MGA doesn't prove what you think it does.
It is still the case that something playing the role of "primitive
matter - per Peter Jones" is necessary in every world, and that
role is to pick out what exists from what doesn't.
That looks like a fairy tale to me. The only role of such
conception of matter seems to be the prevention of digging
deeper ... and there is the risk of the elimination of the person.
In a sense you give a name to God, you say it that one u, it wins
the competition by definition, because we see it.
It looks like a muddle to say that everything exists in every world.
Yes. I don't say that, note.
In general we don't "see" primitive matter - all the theories of
elementary particles are mathematical models which are only
indirectly supported by what we see.
Yes. Primitive matter is a notion extrapolated from the mundane high
level life. It is a metaphysical hypothesis, but it has indirect
consequences that we can test.
As a rationalist I am not satisfied by such an explanation, if you
keep in mind that my interests are on the mind-body problem.
The MGA shows that such magical matter has "magical properties" non
Turing emulable, to be able to do what they do, without
necessitating the lowering of the level.
Lowering the level to where? The MGA depends on the idea of
providing for all counterfactual possibilities.
This is unclear. With comp, we don't need to emulate all your
histories to make you behaving like if you were conscious, in one
history.
I think this leads to requiring emulation an arbitrarily large
domain of the world emulated - essentially another complete world.
But in a complete world "emulation" is meaningless; emulation is
only relative to "real".
The whole point is: what is real? With comp, any universal system will
do, but we have to fix it to identify machines and numbers, like we
need a base in QM to identify states and rays.
But the point is that it is testable, and it can fail where another
notion of computationalism might succeed, like computability-in-a-
ring (Blum, Shub, Smale), or with diverse sorts of Oracle.
How can you test the proposition that computation can instantiate
consciousness?
By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well,
comp + the classical theory of knowledge).
Bruno
Brent
To define "exists" by "exists physically" seems to beg the question
to me, and also is not very clear, given that the logic of QM is
not boolean, and many want to describe it as a "knowledge" type of
logic (notably by those wanting to avoid the Everett "explosion of
realities").
Bruno
Brent
Still, they say "yes" to the doctor, but only because their
artificial brain will be made of primitive matter. Unlike Craig,
they don't ask for special matter like carbon, but they do ask
for some primitive matter. They might ask for some God instead,
of course. It is almost a use of "matter" as a god for creating a
gap in the explanation, and if primitive matter existed, they can
make that logical point. We cannot prove them logically wrong,
but with the MGA we can shows them to be close to non-sense,
especially if you can distinguish the evidence of the reality of
matter with (impossible) evidence for primitive matter.
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