On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".

If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature.


When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't.



That's why I think the MGA doesn't prove what you think it does. It is still the case that something playing the role of "primitive matter - per Peter Jones" is necessary in every world, and that role is to pick out what exists from what doesn't.

That looks like a fairy tale to me. The only role of such conception of matter seems to be the prevention of digging deeper ... and there is the risk of the elimination of the person. In a sense you give a name to God, you say it that one u, it wins the competition by definition, because we see it.

A logician's attitude. Giving a name, or even a definition, doesn't imply existence or even provide any properties. Every reductionist theory has an ontology in which something is fundamental - in your theory it is digital computations. What difference does it make whether you call it "primitive matter", "computations", or "God" - the differences must be in what the theory predicts; not in the name of the ur-stuff.


As a rationalist I am not satisfied by such an explanation, if you keep in mind that my interests are on the mind-body problem. The MGA shows that such magical matter has "magical properties" non Turing emulable, to be able to do what they do, without necessitating the lowering of the level.

But the point is that it is testable, and it can fail where another notion of computationalism might succeed, like computability-in-a-ring (Blum, Shub, Smale), or with diverse sorts of Oracle.

It can't fail until it predicts something definite. I've asked whether comp can explain why QM is based on complex Hilbert space instead of quaternion or octonion Hilbert space. Computationally one should be as good as the other.


To define "exists" by "exists physically" seems to beg the question to me,

And to say "exists" means "realized by the sum infinite computations" seems to avoid the question to me.

and also is not very clear, given that the logic of QM is not boolean, and many want to describe it as a "knowledge" type of logic (notably by those wanting to avoid the Everett "explosion of realities").

The explosion of realities is not something observed - it is postulated just to keep physical evolution unitary. I would think you would find a theory like quantum bayesianism congenial since it takes 1p experience as fundamental.

Brent

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