On 16 May 2014, at 00:50, Dennis Ochei wrote:
I meant borne. Subjective expectation is the problem. It's not clear
that you can "partially" partake in an experience. An experience is
either yours or it is someone elses.
Yes. thanks to brain connectedness. That is why the probability is 1/2
in the Washington-Moscow duplication experience.
But that's a point of a notion of identity conservation for some self-
transformation.
Bruno
On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/15/2014 12:57 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
More like me than anything else in the universe is not sufficient
for subjective expectation. Im not asking whether my appearance,
personality, and memories are preserved (they are) I'm asking
whether these properties are born by the same "I" of the present
I don't understand "born by"? Maybe you meant "borne"? But that's
reifying "I" over and above all its properties. Why do that? I'm
just questioning the all-or-nothing. Why can't "I" just consist of
most of the properties "I" had yesterday?
Brent
On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/15/2014 9:27 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question
cannot be graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or
someone else will who is merely like me will.
Why "merely"? Why isn't "more like me than anything else in the
universe" enough to "be" you?
But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single
memory destroys me, then we are right back to the empty view, if i
can survive these kinds of transformations then we return to the
open view
I don't see it? Why the all-or-nothing conclusion? You have more
of your memories than I do; so we are distinct.
Brent
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