On 15 May 2014, at 18:27, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Parfit denies the existence of personal identity altogether, what is
left merely psychological and biological relatedness relations.
Personal identity works if everyone is one person, but i dont want
to be forced by my view of personal continuity to be an extreme
altruist
Personal identity works if I am solely me right now but that is
nearly as bad as the open case, as I have no real good reason to
care more about my future self than others.
But then you want not only care about your own future, and at the same
time care about the others caring about their own future. If not,
everyone lose.
The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question
cannot be graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or
someone else will who is merely like me will. But memories can be
gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single memory destroys me,
then we are right back to the empty view, if i can survive these
kinds of transformations then we return to the open view
In theory, and that can have practical consequences. We are all the
universal person, but the reasons to become a many is in the self-
recognition, despite the differences. But those differences are
important to give the sense of saying hello to oneself. If not you
talk like if you were enlightened and confirms you say stuff from G*
minus G. You fall in the theological trap, and you will eliminate
first person and their lives. It is like losing motivation for life
because you get a glimpse of the afterlife.
Bruno
On Thursday, May 15, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 15 May 2014, at 06:51, Dennis Ochei wrote:
But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...
Ypou mention Parfit, which put the identity on the person series,
and that makes it non transitive. Take the step 3 of the UDA, in the
paper I refer you too, and which is supposed to be sudtied on this
list (I explain this since many years).
We have that from the first person point of view, the guy in M and
the guy in W are the same guy as the original in Helsinki (say), yet
they are not the same guy after the duplication. There is no
paradox. The usual identity criterion is given by the personal
memories and their structured integration.
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school,
for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in
his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced
life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that
when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been
flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of
his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness
of his flogging.
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE'S
doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who
took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same
person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any
truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who
was flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does not
reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr
LOCKE'S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore
the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with
him who was flogged at a school.
No problem with this. It is the amnesia thought experiment, and it
shows that we are the same person, once we assume computationalism.
That is plausibly the universal person that the logic G and G*
justify to be a notion or person canonically attached to any
(universal) machine.
Bruno
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote:
You can still care if you die normally but something like the
swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival
under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to
accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to
be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation
preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is
purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as
deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you
subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in
any sense the same consciousness that you remember being
I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your
current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into
the same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your
memories then there is some partial sameness between me now and
myself this morning that doesn't exist between me and anyone else.
(Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...)
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